U.S.A AND
IRAQ’S POLICIES IN THE GULF: AN EXAMINATION OF THE TWIN CONCEPTS OF DEFENCE AND
FOREIGN POLICIES IN THE EXTERNAL BEHAVIOUR OF STATES
By
Olufemi P. Adelusi (Ph.D)
Abstract
The chapter examines the U.S.A and Iraq’s policies in
the Gulf region through the prism of the relationship between the twin concepts
of Defence and Foreign policies.It dwells on the nature of the external
behaviour of both states in the Gulf. Certain findings revealed that the
national interest component of the concept of foreign policy led to the articulation
of the war policy component of the concept of defence policy by the two states.
A further examination of the external behaviour of the US and Iraq in the Gulf
Crisis also revealed that a combination of national economic interest and power
calculus were strong determinants in the eventual breakdown of diplomatic
solution to the divergent interests and issues involved in the Gulf States
system to which the two States understudy were relating to.The chapter
concludes with an hypothesis on the indivisibility of the notions of foreign
and defence policies in States’ external behaviour: That as long as States in
their interactions with other States are guided primordially by narrowly
defined national interest, the realization of which renders them incompatible
with those of others, so will States continue to design defence policies whose
objectives are to defend such interests if it means going to war.
INTRODUCTION
The United States of America (USA)
and Iraq are operators in the international system of states. Each has its own
conception of Foreign and defence policy. While USA might lay claim to some
preventions as a super power, which implies the right to have far flung
interests in all corners of the globe, it nevertheless has certain core
international interest components of its position to that of any other states,
like Iraq.
Both USA and Iraq are two countries
involved in the Gulf War, though on opposing camps. They see their involvement
as means of protecting their higher interests. In other words, they see their
defence policies (war policies) as the continuation of their foreign policies.
We set out in this chapter, to
examine the USA and Iraq’s policies in the light of corresponding relations
between their respective defence and foreign policies.
The chapter is divided into four
parts namely, the Introduction, the first Section, which is the Conceptual
Clarification. The second Section, which is to treat the Determinants of USA
and Iraq’s policies in the Gulf coupled with the operationalization of the
concepts in the cases of the two countries. The fourth part is the conclusion.
I. CONCEPTUAL
CLARIFICATION
The concept of Foreign policy is
taken as a generic one. It has been described as a collection of discreet and
disparate policies that have long and short term strategies directed to the
outside world. (Jones,
R. E. 1970:59) Furthermore, such policies as shaped by internal,
external circumstances and the perceptions or images of the decision makers.
(Ibid) Foreign policies is also
viewed as an outward extension of a state’s domestic policy. Indeed, one may
ask why then do Nation-States have foreign policies? Among the reasons for
states having foreign policies are three principal ones echoed by a scholar. (Professor Olajide
Aluko, 1982/83 )They are the reasons linked to territorial propinquity or
proximity, in short, the geographical nearness of the countries propel them to
pursue some policies outside their borders. A country cannot escape its
neighbours. A French diplomat, Jules Cambon, rightly highlighted this necessity
by summing up the situation thus “The geographical position of a nation … is
the principal reason why it must have a foreign policy at all…” (Cailbon, J. 1930:174)
Another reason why nations have
foreign policies follows the positive and negative ends/goals continuum. As
regards the positive goal, it means that if country A can increase its trade
towards country B, then, it can be said that such country A is pursuing a
foreign trade policy, which is still foreign policy, an extension of her
domestic production-trade policy. In short, country A is developing a foreign
policy for what she can gain from the international relation system.
On the other hand, the negative
goal/end symbolizes the persistence of the pariah states of Israel and South
Africa, in remaining in the United Nations system, solely to avoid any negative
ends.
The third and probably the final
category of reasons for why Nation-States have foreign policies is that, that
smirk of symbol of independence. Since dependent States cannot make foreign
policies, thus the foreign policy of a nation could be said to date to its
independence. This involving the signing of treaties, holding of international
obligations and others.
Other definitions of the concept of
foreign policy offered by scholars include the following: Foreign policy is
seen as “The formulation, implementation and evaluation of external choices
within one country, viewed from the perspective of that country”. ( Dougherty. James E. and Robert L.
Pfatzgraff, 1971 :23) On
another plane, it is taken as referring to “a set of practical measures,
sometimes coherent, but often by no means intrinsically consistent, utilized by
governments to meet (problems in relations with other States)”. (Roy E. Jones, op cit :59)Still further
on the definition of the concept, another scholar has defined it as “the
objectives and action that result from the capabilities, needs and aspirations
of a country in relation to other states”. (Holsti K.J., 1978:17)
For the purpose of our analysis in
this chapter, we have limited definition of foreign policy to the simplest of
all available definitions, which is, that foreign policy is an extension of the
domestic policy or politics of a Nation-State.
As a follow up to this our
definition, one would like to also add that, the core policy in the foreign
policy is the pursuit of “national interest” of Nation-State. One might quickly
add that the concept of “national interest” is wide and complex but, it is
agreed among scholars that there exists core and peripheral interests. The core
interests evoke passion and possibility of the employment of force for its
realization while the peripheral interest are defensible by diplomatic means
and they re less vital to the survival of the Nation-State.
A look at the concept of “Defence
Policy” is appropriate at this stage, in order to be able to examine the
relationship that exists between it and the former concept of “Foreign Policy”.
According to A. J. Goodpaster,
Defence is taken to refer both to actual military conflict and to the military
preparations for such conflicts, indeed the employment of armed forces in
combat operations, whether at the level of all out war or for limited
intervention or local self-defence.
(Goodpaster, A.J. 1972:53)
Thus defence policy covers both the fighting that would take place in
event hostilities of whatever kind should occur and the military establishment
that is built and maintained to meet the fundamental, ultimate end. (Ibid)
It is of primary importance to note
that defence policy is not made in vacuum and thus, defence policies and the
levels and kinds of force designed to implement them are responses to the
actual or potential threats the nation faces. (Donald M. Snow, 1987:73). Defence policy carries with it a crucial
component which is the national security comparable to the national interest
component concept of foreign policy.
It is the definition and the
operationalization of this national security concept in the defence policy that
reveals the seeming similarity of the two main concepts under study in this chapter.
National security has been defined as “that part of government policy having as
its objective the creation of national and international political conditions
favourable to the protection or extension of vital national values against
existing and potential adversaries”. (Bruce E. Arlinghaus, 1984:3)
In another vein, the concept of
National Security has traditional emphasized the security of the Nation State
as its primary concern, hence the adjectival use of the term national. The
second part of the concept is security. One may ask what contributes to a sense
of security? And conversely, what makes one insecure? The primary dictionary
definition of the term captures both the meaning and dimensions of security
which is “the state or feeling of being free from fear, care, danger etc safety
or a sense of safety” (Snow, D.M op cit)
According to
Robert S. McNamara, former United States’ Secretary of Defence and former
President of the World Bank,
“In a modernizing society, security is not
military hardware, though it may involve it, security is not traditional
military activity, though it may encompass it. Security is development and
without development there can be no security”. (Robert S. McNamara,
1968:149)
Traditional view of national security
emphasizes the physical aspect; from this view point, the most obvious
component of national security is the protection of national boundaries from
encroachment by other nation. (Donald M. Snow, op cit: 4)Other physical
forms of security such as guaranteed access to natural resources can be pursued
only after hearth and home have been secured. (Donald M. Snow, Ibid)
Defence policies are then considered
as being fashioned to meet the actual or potential threats posed by foes,
therefore assessing adversaries and their intentions and their capabilities is
a further element in understanding policy. (Donald M. Snow ,Ibid: 1) Those
threats in turn imply the existence of other nations whose interests come into
conflict with one country’s and who may decide that military action or threat
is the appropriate means to realize their interests. These kinds of adversaries
actions are said to largely define the external environment in which defence
policies are developed. (Donald M. Snow Ibid: 73)
According to Douglas Murray and Paul
Vioti, Defence policies of Nations consist primarily of three dimensions;
firstly, the international environment in which the states exists and in
particular, the threats it perceives as coming from that environment. Second,
the state’s national objective as specified in its national strategy and
military doctrine, and thirdly, the recurrent issues or defence policy outputs
of the process. (Douglas Murray and Paul Vioti (eds), 1982:6-7),
(Celestine O. Bassey, 1987:93)
Having examined the definitions of
the twin concepts of Foreign and Defence Policies, it is in order to briefly
draw the similarity, interconnectedness and twin relationship existing between
them.
Celestine O. Bassey gives
the crux of defence policy as the relation of force to national purposes. He
went further by classifying the national purpose into “core” or “context
specific” values, of which enhancement is often considered the high priority
goals of the state’s foreign policy (Bassey, C.O. Ibid: 84). The
relationship between Defence and Foreign Policies has been described as that of
instrumentality;
“As an
instrument of foreign policy, defence policy is concerned with the provision,
deployment and use of military power to facilitate the protection and promotion
of perceived national interests of the State in the international arena”. (Bassey, C.O Ibid: 84)
As posited by Dauglas Murray and Paul
Vioti and restated by C. O. Bassey, Defence policy is in equilibrium when there
is no sharp asymmetric existing among the dominant goals of domestic, security
and foreign policies on the one hand and no major alterations in policy are
taking place, on the other. (Bassey,
C.O Ibid) `
P. McGowan and C. Kegley consider
defence policy and foreign policy as being two sides of the same coin with each
aiming to adapt national societies to their environments.22
(McGowan.P. and C. Kegley, 1980:7)
As it has also been observed, the
degree to which a State mobilizes military potential obviously depends upon the
international situation, the challenges and opportunities it is perceived to
present and the relevant means-end calculations as perceived by its decision
makers. (Bassey, C.O op
cit:88) A situation that vividly brings home the fact that the national
interest component of the concept of foreign policy could and indeed be defined
solely in terms of national security, which is the main component of the
concept of Defence Policy.
Most Nation-State’s foreign policy
objectives, which are, couched as the national interests – both core or vital
and peripheral are also similar to their Defence policy objectives. Just as
John M. Ostheimer and Garry J. Buckley had described the main fundamental
objectives of Nigerian foreign policy as contained in Article 19 and Article 20
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria’s Constitutions of 1979 and 1989
respectively as Nigeria’s national security goals. (John M. Ostheimer and Gary J. Buckley,
1982:258-303)
The fundamental goals of United
States of America’s national security policy is described as the preservation
of the independence, institutions, territory and national interest, as well as
to shape an international order in which United States’ institutions and
freedoms can survive and prosper. (William
J. Weida and Frank L. Gertcher, 1987)
In the final analysis, it becomes
apparent that matters of policy of a state needs to recognize the international
environment to which such a state regulates then the policy which contributes
inputs to and that analyses outputs of the international environment is the
foreign policy.
While foreign policy ensures the
focus of the national interest of a state and what are the core or vital
aspects of it that need to be defended militarily, the defence policy ensures
that the decisions that rely on the use of military action or threat as the
appropriate means of realizing the state’s national interests are put in place.
II. USA AND IRAQ’S POLICIES IN THE GULF AS A
REFLECTION OF FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICIES CONTINUUM.
USA and Iraq’s
policies in the Gulf region as opposed to their Middle East policies
exhibit the
twin aspects of power calculus and economic determinism.
In the main,
before the crisis or the Iraq invasion of Kuwait on the second of August
1990, there
was no consistent US policy to the Gulf, to the Middle East probably. The
particles of
any policy might be taken to include what an analyst has described thus,
“America’s interest in the Gulf and by
extension the Middle East, includes the protection
of Israeli interests – America stands by
her friends; maintenance of a stable supply of
‘Reasonable’ priced oil through the
cultivation of friendship among the lackeys of
Imperialism – the so called moderate Arab
States and by extension, the destabilization of
OPEC”.
(Adelusi, Olufemi, 1985)
Since the
beginning of the Gulf crisis, there has been a Gulf policy from the USA. In an
address by
James Baker, the United States’ Secretary of States, to the Los Angeles World
Affairs
Council, sometimes in October 1990, he referred to what President Bush has
outlined as
the four goals of the US Gulf policy, namely:
i.
The immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all
Iraqi forces from Kuwait as mandated by UN Secretary Council Resolution 660.
ii.
Restoration of Kuwait legitimate government.
iii.
Protection of lives of American citizens held hostages by
Iraq, in both Iraq and Kuwait
iv.
Commitment to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf.
(Onugu,Tony1990:10-11,The
Guardian (Lagos)
It has been recognized early enough
that it is fashionable for American leaders to proclaim the objectives of their
Nation’s foreign policy in religious and universalistic terms, underlining in
the process the purity of their intensions. “(Bush.G.1990:7,The Guardian (Lagos),
Thus one reads James Baker described US Gulf war preparations as
“preparing for war to achieve peace”.
( Okon Udokang’s 1977/78) General Collin Powell, the Chairman of
the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, is also another American leader who has embraced
the universalistic tone of his country’s foreign policy. He says “Hussain’s
aggression is a great repudiation of the encouraging trends in the world and an
outright denial of the rule of law”.
(Baker’s James 1990:5)
The US in pursuing her Gulf policy
has come to recognize the fact that her entire Gulf posture is an extension of
her domestic policy of economic development. President Bush acknowledged the
economic determinism component of his coubtry’s Gulf policy in the following
words, “Our country now imports nearly half the oil it consumes and could face
a major threat to its economic independence”. (General Powell’sb1991:5) In the same vein, General Powell opined
that while it is crude and simplistic and an insult on the American people to
suggest that oil is the only reason that America has led opposition to the
aggression, it is equally naïve to suggest that US’s vital economic interests
are not gravely threatened by this aggression. (The Guardian (Lagos) 1990:6) Thus he
added, “Our vital economic interests are most certainly the reason we have
marshaled forces to oppose Iraq…” (The Guardian (Lagos),
1990:5)
The implication of this high tint of
economic determinism in the US Gulf policy is the fear of Iraq, which already
possesses the world’s second largest reserves of oil, to take the total control
of the Gulf oil reserves. The commitment of US’s armed forces to the Gulf war
is indeed a forceful push in the direction of defending the economic interests
component of her foreign policy on the one hand and the regulation of the
balance of power and control of the situation in the Gulf region which is to
facilitate a peaceful environment for her wider interests in the region on the
other hand.
This linkage between US commitment to
apply force in the Gulf to preserve her source of oil importation and the
liberation of Kuwait Arab regime. It has nevertheless become a point of
contention between American citizens. In contention is whether Arab oil is
worth the shedding of American blood for, on the one hand and the rationale
behind going to fight to restore an absolute monarch and the sovereignty of a
country (Kuwait) that was not democratic, on the other hand. (The
Guardian (Lagos), 1990:5, Ibid)
There is a hidden but important fact
the defence policy of the US is closely linked to her foreign policy. This fact
has been rightly captured by an analyst in one form, when he opines there is
the possibility that US’s armament industries that have started to suffer the
sales slump induced by the ‘end’ of the war will now pick up to reap enormous
profits. (Okwara, Jones1990:4)The
arms production is part of US’s defence policy while the sales of such arms
produced fall into the realm of the foreign economic relations or foreign
policy writ large.
Another dimension to the above point
is that the internal politics of the US with regards to the Defence budget and
the arms race is a component of the Nation’s foreign relations with USSR. AS
political observers are wont agree to, with the end of the cold war and the
consequent disappearance of the so called “evil empire” with its competitive
arms race stakes, the USA has to in a very logical sequence, reduce the defence
budget in conformity with the present realities and the untold hardship brought
about on both the international economy in inflation terms and the
international economic system caused by the astronomical defence budget
component.
As history will record it, it was
precisely this new dispensation that was preoccupying the minds of most of the
US congressmen while examining the defence budget estimate as presented to them
by the US. Defence secretary in the historic opportune moment when Iraq’s
invasion of Kuwait was announced. Left to the US Congressmen, with the end of
the cold war, their country does not need to keep the high profile of the
previous defence spending and thus had set on reducing this budget to take care
of the deficit. To keen observers of US politics, it was imperative on the part
of the ‘hawks’ at pentagon, the US defence ministry to cook up or find a
replacement for the evil empire and thus either shore up the large defence
spending if it could not be increased or left at its present size. Iraq’s
invasion of Kuwait presented these hawks, the diversion and substitute.
It presented no surprise to anyone
therefore, to see the speed in which the US rushed her troops and warships in
the neighbouring Middle-Eastern and Asian bases to Saudi Arabia, before almost
begging in an attempt to convince the Saudi of the necessity for US troops to
be received on her soil to defend her, thus succeeding in breaking the Saudi
Arabian persistent refusal of granting military base to the US. The military
implication of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the need for the US to maintain it
troops on alert and deployment is another justification to withhold any further
downward revision of the current US defence budget by the country’s
Congressmen. A stay of action is permitted and has thus been achieved by this
Gulf crisis effect.
Having analyzed the correlation
between the defence and foreign policies responses of the US to the Gulf
crisis, we might now turn to examine the Iraq’s policies.
Iraq’s geographical location is in
the Persian Gulf region. She is by natural endowment, a partner in the Gulf scheme
of things and one of the movers of the Persian Gulf history. Iraq cannot choose her neighbours. Indeed,
the main reason for Iraq’s immediate foreign policy dictates comes from her
geographical location. Even by extension, Iraq views her political fortune as
residing in the development of both the national interest and power calculus
components of her foreign policy. Both components are mutually inclusive as the
height of her national interest could indeed be said to be the need to enhance
her power status in her Gulf region and in the immediate neighbouring region of
the Middle-East.
Iraq’s policy in the Gulf region
could be taken as the attainment of ‘great power status’ to enable her achieve
her economic development needs as well as to recover the historic greatness of
her race, much of which is reportedly traceable to the great fathers of Iraq.
The evidence of this is visible in
the four point conditions for leaving Kuwait given to the UN and the US led
coalition (Yakubu ALIYU,1990 :4) namely:
i.
That Israel must withdraw unconditionally from the all
occupied territories.
ii.
That the Syrian troops must withdraw from Lebanon.
iii.
That the US troops must be withdrawn from Saudi Arabia and
replaced with Arab troops.
iv.
That the UN Secretary Council’s economic sanction on Iraq
must end.
The kernel of these conditions is the
projection of Iraq as the hero of the Palestinians and the indisputable Arab
power in the Gulf. Iraq nevertheless know that these conditions would never be
fulfilled and indeed they were never fulfilled. They thus represented simply a
response to US’s own four points issued as ultimatum and solutions for averting
war.
A further breakdown of the twin
elements of Iraq’s policy in the Gulf mentioned above will show us how the
national interest of Iraq had led her to war policies on two occasions in the
same region. Being with Iraq; 1980 –
1988 and the current one, designed to defend annexed Kuwait against the so
called multi-national of Allied forces led by the United States of America. In
passing, it is necessary to briefly note that the approaches to the observation
and measurement of power in international relations have been categorized along
three lines namely: one, by control over resources, second, by control over
actors and third, by control over events and outcomes. ( Sunday Tribune (Ibadan),1991:8-9) None of these forms of power
could be said to be absent in both the defence policy design and foreign policy
articulation as well as implementation of the Iraqi government with regards to
the Gulf and nearby Middle-East regions.
It is along the above
categories that our examination of Iraq invaded neighbouring Gulf States of
Kuwait on the second of August after bilateral negotiations hosted by Saudi
Arabia broke down. The main reasons advanced by Iraq for the invasion include
the following:
i.
“Kuwait’s former rulers were involved in a conspiracy to
debilitate Iraq’s economy” (HART,
Jeffrey“1976:289-305)
ii.
That there was “historical proof that Kuwait was actually a
part of Iraq severed by British in 1913 in preparation for the World War I”. (The Guardian (Lagos).
iii.
Iraq was piqued by Kuwait’s reluctance to show understanding
and contribute economically to the resuscitation of her battered economy. She
believed, she fought the war against Iran on the behalf of the Gulf countries. (Ibid)
iv.
Iraq accuses Kuwait of “stealing $4 billion of Iraq oil from
Rumalia Oil Field along their common border. (Sunday Tribune (Ibadan)1991)
Iraq’s option to annex
Kuwait falls within the category of control, both over resources and actor in
the Gulf. Iraq, by invading Kuwait, implies that she wants to have control over
oil resources, which has made Kuwait the highest per capita income country in
the world, and possibly draw down the enormous foreign assets of the country,
which is reported to be in the neighbourhood of $100 billion. Iraq by her
action furthermore, would be in a position to regularize the allegation that
Kuwait and the United Arab Emirate conspired to pump oil in excess of 1.5
million and 1 million barrels respectively allocated to them by the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which had had the effect
of forcing down the OPEC dictated price of oil. Iraq on the other hand had
always supported a high price of oil since the end of her war with Iran
Another implication of
Iraq’s would be manifest control over resources and actors in the Gulf region
is the latent one, which might lead Iraq to have additional control over events
and outcome in her region – the Gulf and by extension in the Middle-East. Thus
the quest for the title of the ‘most powerful nations’ in the Gulf region and
later the ‘saviour of the Arabs’ under the an aggressive pursuit of Arab
nationalism would have been achieved. The Arab nationalism so described by an analyst
as “so called new Arab nationalism, the nationalism which is rooted in
nasserism and now is under the influence of Islamic fundamentalism”. ( African Concord (Lagos). Jan 28 1991:26-27)
Iraq’s likely overall
control over resources actors and events and outcomes in the Gulf region, is
likely to bring her national interest to conflict with those of the allies –
moderate Arab Kingdoms, of United States and possibly, that of Israel, a baby
of, or the 52nd States of the US.
The acquisition of the
forms of power described above by Iraq exposes her foreign policy aims in the
Gulf and of her defence policy, could not but be the outcome, in order to
effectively gain and maintain the position so desired.
The Iraqi President
expressed his nation’s defence posture in the following words “this force in
Iraq is for the entire nation, for the protecting shield for the whole nation
ans a sharp force at the hand of the nation and this could defend the value of
the nations”. (ZVYAGELSKAYA,Irina,
1991:4)
On the other hand, a
thorough analysis of the above reasons advanced by Iraq for invading Kuwait, a
sovereign State might allow us an insight into those considerations of Iraq.
The first reason given, relates to an allegation against Kuwait regarding her
conspiration to debilitate Iraq’s economy. This particular allegation is by all
means a serious one. One would expect that any state coming out of a gruesome
eight year long war would need reconstruction both physical and economic. In
order to carry this out, all the financial help and aid would be welcome.
One may ask, in what ways
could Kuwait must have conspired to debilitate Iraq’s economy? Political
observers are quick to point to Iraq’s repeated accusation against Kuwait and
the United Arab Emirate of pumping oil in excess of their allotted quotas in
the OPEC, a situation that could have brought down the price of oil.
Iraq has petroleum oil as
her national product, which she could and in fact has been putting out for
exchange in the international market, for the desired national revenue, which
if handsomely earned could help her quick economic and physical recovery. A
high price of the commodity as fixed by the petroleum cartel could help Iraq’s
interests as discussed above. A low price is debilitating. A government worth
its salt is charged with the provision of economic development for her
citizenry so any obstacle to the achievement of this objective may be
considered a security risk in terms of the vitality – the objective in the
national interest considerations of the nation. Going by this calculation,
Kuwait, if found on the wrong side of the allegation has put herself against
Iraq’s vital national interests.
Should this threat to
Iraq’s economic survival be sufficient to drive her to a war policy in the
Gulf? Well, it is difficult to condemn a nation, whose core or vital national
interest is challenged. Indeed, what pushes a country to strong defence policy
other than a slight on her territorial integrity is the economic strangulation
by a foreign enemy or an economic saboteur.
On the second allegation,
that is, Kuwait as having been historically part of of Iraq, but severed by
British in 1913 is preparation for World War I, one might consider this fact as
insufficient for a war policy, although, it is on record as some historians
have argued that in 1958, Abdal Karim Quasi threatened to take over Kuwait
arguing that “ethnically, geographically., and socially, Kuwait and Iraq were
one country that had been arbitrarily divided by Britain”. (Saddam
Hussein, 1991:4)
Though Iraq formally
recognized the sovereignty of Kuwait in 1963, but she invaded her a decade
later, only to withdraw immediately, (Sunday Tribune (Ibadan), op.cit) proving that the
August 2, 1990 invasion was the second time out.
The third allegation
against Kuwait, regarding her reluctance to show understanding and contribute
economically to the resuscitation of Iraq’s battered economy, it is a case of
morality in international politics if Kuwait and some Gulf countries were in
agreement with Iraq for waging war against Iran’s Islamic Revolution out of the
fear that the victory of Iran might shake the region and had thereby, alleged
to have contributed billions of US dollars to the war efforts of Iraq, they
were thus morally bound to contribute to the resuscitation of the latter. Like
it was put forward above, it is purely a question of morality in politics.
The last reason given by
Iraq for invading Kuwait consist of the allegation against Kuwait as “stealing”
$4 billion of oil from Rumalia Oil Field along their common border. This
borders on infringement on territorial integrity cum economic sabotage, it
might not totally be right for Iraq to have accused Kuwait of ‘stealing’ her
oil since the oil field is on a disputed oil rich land. Until the territorial
dispute is settled, no one could lay claim to the said land.
What our
analysis of Iraq’s claim against Kuwait points out is that the foreign policy
especially the national interest component of it together with the national
security component of the country’s defence policy are induced by the
perceptions of the governing elite in such a nation at a period in time. These
perceptions are as value laden as they are power influence conditioned (Sunday
Tribune (1991) (Ibadan),Ibid).
The Iraq’s ruling elite might have been conditioned by her quest for a dominant
power status in the Gulf and the expected role of the great apostle of Arab
nationalism. The two quests are not mutually exclusive; in fact, a status of
dominant regional power when and if achieved will allow Iraq to fulfill the
dream of resuscitating Arab nationalism and the championing of the Palestinian
cause.
IV. CONCLUSION
An examination of concepts in international
relations study is an arduous task on its own. The application of such concepts
to the external behaviour of States is another uneasy task, while relating such
concepts to States’ external behaviour in a State of war presents its own
peculiar near mission impossible. This is so because according to Sun Tzu, a
Chinese theorist who wrote about 500 BC in a book titled, Art of War, was
quoted as saying, among other things that “all warfare is based on deception,
hence when able to attack, we must seem unable, when using our forces, we must
seem inactive, when we are near, we must make the enemy believe that we are far
away …” (Adelusi Olufemi op.cit) Too much
propaganda has eclipsed the real facts from intentions – this applies greatly
to the Gulf policies of the two countries examined in this paper.
Inspite of the difficulty
of our exercise, certain elements of the relationship between the twin concepts
of Defence and Foreign policies in the external behaviour of US and Iraq with
regards to the policies pursued by them in the Gulf, were brought out.
Salient among these
elements of relationship are:
i.
Those that link the domestic constituency of defence policy
with its national security component in the form of high defence spending, in
the case of the United States of America, to her foreign policy formulation and
posture in the Gulf region.
ii.
Iraq’s foreign policy posture as a reincarnated Arab
nationalist leader and the saviour of Palestinian which pushed her to
insatiable quest for power – that of control over the resources, actors, the
events and outcomes in the Gulf, with the resultant designing of a war policy
component of her defence policy.
The centrality of economic
determinism in the national interests definition in the foreign policies of
both the US and Iraq with regards to their Gulf policies is highlighted. The US
was motivated by the need to protect her Gulf resources of ‘cheap’ petroleum
supply and “her commitment to protect the price of oil from the manipulation of
a single man”. (Sunday Tribune (Ibadan)
1991:7)
Furthermore, the US
President, we noted, confessed that his country now imports nearly half the oil
it consumes and could face a major threat to its economic independence. (Sunday
Tribune (Ibadan) 1991
op.cit)
Iraq was pushed to annex
Kuwait because of a conspiracy to debilitate her economy so she said.
The role of power calculus
in the relationship between the defence and foreign policies of the two States
understudy is also important. The USA is “committed to the preclusion of a dominant
power in the Gulf who could undermine her influence in the region”. (The Guardian (Lagos) 1990 op.cit) and the ‘hawk of
the Middle-East’, (Sunday Tribune (Lagos)1991) a great pointer to the
fact Iraq seeks power and indeed additional power through her would be control
over more resources in the Gulf.
(ADELUSI,Olufemi)
Both the USA and Iraq in
their policies in the Gulf have demonstrated their quest for power expressed as
control over actors, resources, events and outcomes. USA wanting to exercise
control on Iraq’s pretension and role in the region, on the price and supply of
petroleum oil as well as on the evolution of events and outcomes of Middle East
and Gulf States relations essentially as it affect or might affect the Arab
Kingdoms, her allies and in particular, Israel.
The domestic determinants
of the defence policies of USA and Iraq are also important variables in the
evolution of their foreign policies, as exhibited in the Gulf. On the part of
the US, the military-industrial complex which ascribes to itself the largest
chunk of the country’s resources and thereby the budget deficit, with its
attendant internal and exportable inflation. The military ‘hawks’ have been
looking for another evil empire sequel to the demise of the age long one in
USSR. Iraq’s posture in the Gulf quickly offers the US’s defence ministry a
substitute scapegoat, on who to pin the continued need for high defence budget
and spending. The net effect of this is to push the US into hasty war mongering
policies in the Gulf, thereby deploying more efforts at seeing to a military
confrontation than those made to see a peaceful solution in the form of
economic sanctions as a viable options to the Gulf crisis and war. (The Guardian (Lagos) 1991:7)
Iraq’s overblown defence
budget, numerical strength of people under arms and war experience and exposure
are ingredients that might have contributed to the Iraqi decision to prefer
armed intervention in Kuwait. It is hardly surprising that the survival of any
government is not guaranteed with idle, combat tested one million soldiers.
Nothing can best
illustrate the indisputable oneness of the twin policies of defence and foreign
policies than the cry of a father of a US marine while writing in The New York Times sometime in September,
1990 was quoted thus “if American diplomacy hadn’t been on vacation for the
better part of a decade, we wouldn’t be in the spot we are today… (Newsweek (New York) 1990:40)
What this can be
interpreted to means is an instrument is sound for most of the past decade
toward the Gulf, then US’ citizens (armed forces), among whom the man’s son is,
would not be involved in fighting a war now.
Finally, this chapter is
best concluded with the hypothesis that, as long as States in their relations
are guided primordially by their national interests, especially when such
interests are too narrowly defined and the realization of which bring them
automatically in conflict with each others interests, they will continue to
design defence policies whose objectives are to enforce the realization of such
interests even if it means going to war.
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