NIGERIA AND FRANCE IN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF
SPILL-OVER EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC INTO POLITICAL RELATIONS
By
Olufemi P. Adelusi (Ph.D)
INTRODUCTION
Political and economic
relations between Nigeria and France since 1970 had developed on unequal basis
(GambarI, Ibrahim 1987:239-248) many activities were witnessed in the
economic relations sector (Ibrahim, Jibrin 1986:21) while the
political relations had been cordial.
Nigeria’s need to
diversify its trading and economic partners in terms of markets for its crude
oil exports and foreign joint investments as well as France’s search for bigger
markets for her finished manufactured products on one hand and her need to
diversify her sources of petroleum imports from the turbulent Middle Eastern
sources, all contributed to fostering the economic relations between Nigeria
and France.
In what way has the
important economic relations between Nigeria and France spilled over to their
political and diplomatic relations?
It is our intention in
this chapter to provide answer to this question by analysing Nigeria-France
relations in Chadian crisis of the seventies and the eighties.
CHAD IN NIGERIAN AND FRENCH POLICY PERCEPTIONS
The Chadian crisis can be
considered above all an internal problem linked to nation building process
going on inside the country. This
process cannot but reveal the heterogeneous nature of the ethnic groups
composing Chadian State, the unequal political participation as well as the
unequal level of internal economic development among the different regions
inside the country.
Nigeria considers the
Chadian internal affairs; this Nigerian position was aided by Chadian authorities’
attitude. They gave the impression of
being able to put things under control as long as they could depend on French
military and technical aid (Nwokedi, Emeka 1984:27) Nevertheless, it is on record that the
Nigerian authorities has been following attentively the Chadian affair. If it is true that Nigeria never had any
clearly defined policy towards Chad in early 1970s (Ibid:25)
indeed, Nigeria had demonstrated her fears
as regards the presence of French troops in Chad as far back as 1969 (
Fawole,W.A. 1981 –1983:96-97).
Consequently, Nigerian
government under General Gowon engaged in discussions in 1970 with the then
Chadian head of State, Tombalbaye at Maiduguri (Nigeria) in order to find means
of resolving the Chadian crisis as well as putting an end to the presence of
foreign troops stationed in Chad.
Nigeria’s interest in
seeing to the evacuation of foreign troops from the neighbouring countries lies
in he preoccupation with territorial and national security especially when it
still exists a fragile national consensus as well as peace in the country. Thus we consider Nigeria’s intervention in
the Chadian crisis in terms of national security imperatives7 (Ibid: 97)
Being a member of the O. A. U.
mediation committee charged with the resolution of boundary conflicts involving
Libya and Chad, Nigeria had been following with keen interest the evolution of
the Chadian crisis since 1977. It was
not until 1978, that she was directly involved in Chad following the French and
Swiss call on her assistance in rescuing their two citizens taken as hostages
in the lake Chad region by the Troisieme Armee du FROLINAT (.Daniel
Bach, 1984:125-126)
Seeing this Nigeria’s
intervention being a success, the French foreign Affairs minister at the time,
Mr. Louis de GuirinGaud, while on a visit Lagos decided to seek the help of his
Nigerian counterpart, Colonel Henri Adefowope, asking him to come in to bolster
the search for national reconciliation already started by the Chadian President
Felix Malloum. (Akinterinwa, Bola 1982:259)
The role of France in Chad
is summarised as follows; that she being the principal extra-african power
operating in West and Central Africa, she is in a position of force to put her
weight behind efforts at finding solutions to regional security problems (John
Chipman, John 1986:93)
Following the French minister for
foreign affair’s request for Nigeria’s active in Chad mentioned earlier on, can
we see in this French request, a devolution of role to Nigeria as regards Chad
or rather, can it be seen as a prolongation of positive bilateral relations
into the realm of diplomatic and political relations? It is noteworthy that it was this French
appeal to Nigeria to intervene in efforts at finding solutions to the Chadian crisis
that marked the beginning of the understanding or working co-operation between
Nigeria and France over Chad.
Besides the Nigeria’s
success in putting an end to French and Swiss hostage affair in Chad through
her mediation efforts, other factors could best explain this diplomatic
rapprochement’ between Nigeria and France.
According to a political observer of Chadian affairs, the intense
economic and commercial relations noticeable in the early eighties between the
two States were not without spill-over effects on their diplomacy in Chad (Otayek, Rene 1983:93)
In fact, in 1978, Nigeria
was the most important market for French goods in Africa South of the Sahara
and its fourth most important place for French foreign investments in the world (Delancey.M.W 1983:172) Another factor
is attributable to the redefinition and re-deployment in the determination of
French interests in Africa especially under President Giscard d’Estaing (Otayek
Rene, 1979: 53) Finally, there was this Chado-Libyan unification project of
January 1981. As it has been observed,
it was this unification project which aroused the curiosity and the
condemnation of Nigerian leaders for reasons linked to regional balance of
power (Nwokedi Emeka (1984:32)
The co-operation between
Nigeria and France over Chadian crises took place under a climate of intrigues
and unstable alliance formations on the part of the chief actors of the Chadian
conflict. Nigeria decided to hold the
Chadian peace conference in March 1979 at Kano.
A coincidence was observed between this Nigerian decision to mediate and
the announcement in the same month of March, by the French of the removal of
their forces stationed in Chad (Otayek Rene Ibid). According to a political observer, this
coincidence was in fact a real one and that it was a product of a deep
understanding (Ibid).
Put in proper
perspectives, the Nigerian decision to hold the Kano conference was taken after
the French government has made the proposition to it as a follow up to the
French incapability to forcefully evacuate the Libyan forces from the Chadian territories
(Nwokedi Emeka, 1979:201)
It is important to
underline what were the side motivations for Nigeria’s initiatives on Chad in
1979 and in 1983. It was observed that
among other things, the Nigeria’s wish to reduce the French weight in the
regional influence game was very important (Daniel BACH:1-6) At the same time,
it could be added that this wish also marked the limit of the co-operation
between Nigeria and France as well as any spill over effects that their
economic relations might have over their politico-diplomatic relations.
The bad State of affairs
in Nigeria’s relations with France over Chad seems to be a consequence of the
in-congruency between the French government’s perception of the role she
assigned or would have wished to assign to Nigeria over Chadian affairs; that
is the role of a regional power challenging the Libyan influence in Chad (Nwokedi
Emeka:17) “1986 and Nigeria’s refusal to play game.
The Nigerian government
did not feel threatened by colonel Ghadaffi’s troops in Chad and it does not
believe in the Western countries propagandist theory of Libyan expansion in
West Africa; if Nigeria’s president Shehu Shagari criticised Libyan presence in
Chad, it is because continued Libyan presence in Chad incites further foreign
intervention (Suzanne Cronje,
1981:910-911)
On the 4th of
May 1979, four Chadian factions or tendencies (French preferences) which where
among the signatories of the Kano I accord decided to form a new union
government with Loi Chaoua as the head.
Nigeria as well as Libya contested the legitimacy of this government on
the grounds that it “violates the Kano accord” and it was considered as “a toy
manipulated from Paris”. (Afriwue Contemporaine, 1979:27) This is because it was only the French
authorities that gave recognition and supported the Chaoua government (Emeka
Nwokedi:7)
The Nigeria’s hard
position vis-à-vis this Chaoua government was further encouraged by the
unequivocal assertion by the Chadian government, of its total confidence in
France their former colonial masters, than in any other country in helping them
in the difficult task of national reconciliation, for the simple reason that
the French knows and understand best their problems than other countries ( Otayek, Rene 1979:57)
If it is true that the co-operation
between Nigeria and France broke down due to different positions taken by the
two countries as regards Chadian government of Chaoua; this does not signify
the end of their co-operation in Chad.
Another occasion came into being in January 1981.
Going against one of the
supposedly governing principles of Nigeria’s foreign policy, The principles
which tend to discourage any foreign intervention in the African problems and
especially, French intervention, Nigeria went ahead to join efforts with
extra-african powers to combat the Chado-Libyan unification project (Pauline
Baker,H. 1984:85) To that end, in
January 1981, the Nigerian minister of foreign affairs in the person of
Professor Ishaya Audu, making use of his official visit to Paris, announced
that Nigeria was ready to furnish Chad with all forms of necessary aid
including military aid (under the auspices of the O.A.U) to resist the Libyan
pressures over the unification project ( Times (Lagos),1978)
Essentially, the strategy
(which was French in origin) was to persuade Goukouni Oueddei to press for the
departure of Libyan troops and in return for additional direct French military
aid as well as the stationing of a Pan-african peace keeping Force in
Chad. Nigeria’s acceptance of this
strategy which included a peace keeping force, sponsored by O.A.U. with
Nigerian troops, the logistical support supplied by France and U.S.A was
described as being historical (Pauline Baker,H 1984:85)
Nigeria later played a
prominent role in the peace keeping force in Chad. A force in which its efficiency and
effectiveness to carry out its mission was affected by both the rivalries
between different Chadian factions as well as by its own proper financial and
logistical problems. (Nwokedi, Emeka 1981:29)
CONCLUSION
It is admitted that the
co-operation between Nigeria and France in the domain of political and
diplomatic relations especially the so called entente Franco – Nigerian over Chad had its origin in medium and
short term factors; it is being argued that it is difficult to ignore the
spill-over effects of good economic and commercial relations between Nigeria
and France over their political and economic relations especially in their
co-operation over finding solutions to the Chadian crisis.
In other
words, the important economic and commercial relations recorded in Nigeria
France relations since 1975 and the contracts won in 1981 to 1987 (M.O.C.I),
1982:34)
by French companies working in Nigeria created
a favourable climate for joint political and diplomatic initiatives especially
the type we observed over Chad.
Nevertheless, there is a limit to such entente; as it became clear that the divergent interests of the two
countries in the domain of their respective policies on Africa create a wide
gulf between them.
Nigeria finds it a bit
difficult to reconcile her hostility to French influence in Africa south of the
sahara, or the foreign intervention in Africa in general, to the imperatives of
her national security which is only assured with the absence of zones of
conflict and the attendant foreign troops in the neighbouring countries.
Finally, the
French’s principal interest lies in preserving its influence in Chad. .
(M.O.C.I), 1982:34) Chad being her former colony and at the same time, she
wants to be able to demonstrate her capability for intervention on the side of
those French speaking African States, her allies and privileged partners. Thus her major pre-occupation is to make sure
that no solution is found to Chadian conflict that excludes her contribution.
NOTE AND REFERENCES
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