U. N AT 50: A CRITICAL
EXAMINATION OF THE PERFORMANCE OF AFRICAN MICRO-STATES AT THE U.N GENERAL
ASSEMBLY SESSIONS.
BY
Olufemi ADELUSI (Ph.D)
AND
ABSTRACT
The chapter attempts a
critical examination of the performance of Micro-States at the United Nations’
General Assembly sessions. It evaluates
the contributions of the Micro-states through their voting patterns in the cold
war and post cold war periods of the U.N General Assembly sessions.It
concludes with the discovery that the status of the Micro-States limits the
margin of manoeuvring possible in their performances, most especially during
the cold war period and to the extent in post cold war period. The Study proposes sub-regionalist co-operation
among the Micro-States in their participation at the U.N General Assembly
sessions. If this is planned well, it
would help in the attainment of meaningful goals set by such category of
States.
INTRODUCTION
The chapter attempts a critical examination of the
performance of micro-states at the United Nations’ General Assembly
sessions. This is a contribution to
efforts made towards taking a second look at the continued operation and
relevance of the U.N after 50 years or existence as an international
organization.The study narrows down its focus to the African micro-states in
the U.N system; most especially the participation of the micro-states at the
General Assembly sessions was chosen, since that is the forum which allows
their maximum participation and relevance.
The central hypothesis of this study is, that the status of
the African micro-States limits their possible margin of manoeuvring in their
performance especially during the cold war period and to some extent in the
post cold war period. The salient
approach being adopted is the Power Realist theory of international
Relations.The critical questions that came recurring during the study were
those on; why the micro-states continued to persist as actors in the U.N system
and notably at the U.N general Assembly?; could the U.N general Assembly system
be made more effective by the absence of these micro-states of Africa? And
lastly what role could these micro-states of Africa be expected to play in the
post-cold war U.N General Assembly?
For convenience, the study has been organized into four
sections; notably, the first which is this introduction; the second, which
contains, the conceptual clarification of ‘Micro’ States and the history of
their participation at the U.N General Assembly. The Third section attempts an evaluation of
the contribution of these African micro-states through their voting patterns in
the cold war and post cold war periods of the U.N general Assembly. The fourth section concludes the study with
its main discovery and finding as well as a brief summary of the work.
11- CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION OF ‘MICRO’ STATES AND THE
HISTORY OF THE PARTICIPATION OF THESE ‘MICRO’ STATES OF AFRICA AT THE U. N.
The concept of ‘Micro-States’ was first employed with regards
to United Nations by one of its past Secretary General U. Thant.” In 1967, the Secretary General requested that
a limit be set on full membership of ‘micro-states’ because their increased
number would only weaken the U.N “(Encyclopaedia Britannica: 451). At the time this request was made, there
was little doubt as to which categories of states or which geographical area,
these states in question come from. The
Asian and African new nations were obviously the targets.
The main issue raised by this request was that of membership
of the U. N. No action was taken on the
request simply because the issue of membership was regarded as a sensitive one
among the ‘New’ nations of the group earlier indicated.
The categorisation of some countries as ‘micro-states’ has
become very difficult indeed. While
there are objective factors to aid the effort at this categorisation, factors
regarded as the main characteristics of States which are (a) Sovereignty (b)
Territory and (c) Population and Nationalism (Spanier. J. 1990:45); The view that most of these “micro-states
which are not economically viable and are dependent on other states with the
consequence that their sovereignty is in name only” (Spanier J. 1990:56) is open to debate. Countries which satisfy the criteria of large
expanse of territory and high population figures but fail the sovereignty test
in terms of economic unavailability could still come under the categorisation
of ‘micro-states’ as defined.
What clarifies better the concept of ‘micro-states’ than the
list of the poorest nations?. It is
understood that States whose name found itself on the list certainly would have
possessed
“small powers
that have often acted less than they have been acted upon; and their security
frequently depends on the great powers”.
(Spanier J. 1990:55).
African countries dominate the list of the 28 poorest
nations. Nigeria has been placed as the
13th poorest nation on the list. (Ayagi I. 1991).
If it is accepted that Africa possesses that majority of
world’s poorest countries, it is also plausible to agree to the fact that the
African countries on the list be added to the categories of ‘Micro-States’ that
operate at the U. N. Why does African’s
weak States persist?. It is because they
persist that they are operative at the U. N general Assembly. Before we go into positing answers to the
above question; it is in order to consider some definitions of the concept of
‘State’. Max Weber has been credited
with the definition that “a State is a corporate group that has compulsory
jurisdiction, exercise continuous organisation and claims a monopoly of force
over a territory and its population, including all action taking place in the
area of its jurisdiction” (Jackson R. H and Rosberg C. G. 1982:1).
Ian Brownlie (1982) too has been found to have defined the
concept of State in some what a close resemblance to what John Spanier (1990)
had described above as characteristics of States; “the State as a legal person,
recognised by international law, with the following attributes: (a) a defined territory (b) a permanent
population (c) an effective
government (d) independence or the right
‘to enter into relations with other states’”.
His attributes of States and the characteristics of States of John Spanier
(1990) bear close resemblance. What Ian
Brownlie called independence or the right ‘to enter into relations… ‘was called
sovereignty by John Spanier. The
differences being the attribute of effective government and characteristic of
Nationalism what remains are common denominators such as Territory and
Population; though Ian Brownlie qualified his own concept of Population with ‘a
permanent’.
The attempt to examine why Africa’s weak States or
micro-States persist has thrown up the juxta-positioning of the juridical and
empirical statehood. All other factors
of empirical statehood considered; the micro-States of Africa need not continue
to exist. It is the juridical statehood
concept that has accounted for the persistence of these categories of States in
Africa. (Jackson R. H and Rosberg C. G,
1982). When elaborated further, the
indices of Empirical statehood had left the
following observation on micro-states in Africa; “It is also
African governments that are underdeveloped, and in most countries they are
very far from being an instrument of development- The apparatus of power in
African government – the agents, agencies that implement and enforce government
laws, edicts, decrees, orders etc. can in general be considered underdeveloped’
in regard both to their stock of resources and to the development of these
resources. Related to the problem of
institutional weakness in African States is the disaffection of important
elites from the government. The
frequency of military coups is perhaps the best indication of elite alienation
and disloyalty. Governmental
incapability in Black Africa is affected by the small size of the skilled work
force” (Jackson R. H and Rosberg. C. G., 1982).
Among the conditions of the existing pattern of juridical Statehood that
has been maintained in Africa which have contributed to the phenomenon of
micro-states appear to be” (1) The
ideology of Pan-Africanism (2) The
vulnerability of all States in the region and the insecurity of statesmen, (3) The support of the larger international
society, including particularly its institutions and associations, for example
the U. N and its agencies, Commonwealth, Lome Conventions and
Francophonie, (4) The reluctance of
non-African powers to intervene in the affairs of African States without having
been invited to do so by their governments” (Jackson R. H and Rosberg C. G.
1982).
To buttress some of the observations made above on the
juridical statehood with regards to the micro-states of Africa; “The United
Nations can be credited with one momentous triumph for its labours, it has
given stalwart and audacious support to the pageant of decolonisation that has
swept scores of new States into the world community. Nothing does more to excite the identity of
new nations than the sight of their flags and names around U. N tables “(Eban.
A.; 1995:54). Furthermore, “They are not
very interested in the rule of law or in strict interpretations of the
charter. They want change, even
sometimes revolutionary change and see the United Nations as an instrument for
obtaining it “(Encyclopaedia Britannica: 450).
When the U. N founders drafted the charter, they were emerging from a
war in which many nations had lost their independence because of the aggression
of foreign States. The focus was on
State building and the need to ensure that no member States, especially smaller
one, would suffer outside interference.
Yet 50 years later, it is evident that a key challenge to international
stability is the phenomenon of internal conflicts in which authority implodes,
ethnic and religious conflicts erupt, many lives are lost and millions flee
across international borders. (Kennedy P.
and Russett. B, 1995:67). The talk now
is that of rescuing failed nations, or failed States, which is likely to
further strain U. N. budgets (Kennedy P. and Russett B, 1995:67).
That African countries have come to cherish membership of the
U. N is no news. That they favour a
stronger, richer, more active United Nations, in particular, they want more
power for the General Assembly in which they have a majority with Asian
countries (Encyclopaedia Britannica; 450) is also confirmed, abut what the
African countires unlike the other regional groups have not realized is the
value of putting forward their most powerful spokesmen (Garba. J, 1987:179)
While in Asia, Indian, Japan and Pakistan reappear on the security council,
with the micro-states on the continent like Bhuttan, the Maldives Islands and
even Malaysia rarely surface and in Latin America, Brazil need not wait many
long years for her turn, it is only in Africa that the system of rotation being
rigidly adhered to over all other considerations. (Garba. J. 1987:179).
Nigeria is seen by the world (1975-1980) as Africa’s Brazil
or Asia’s Indian, Africa equates Nigeria with Djibouti, the Seychelles or Sao
Tome and Principe (Garba. J). While the situation that existed with regards to
Nigeria’ Power and influence in the late 1970s had changed considerably to what
is obtainable now (Adelusi O. P.1984), it is still valid to affirm that the
persistence of micro-states in Africa (been aided by France’s support,
encouragement and sustenance, of her former colonies which are in the majority
among these micro-States in Africa), (Komolafe. S, 1995) has weakened African
participation at the U. N. The tussle
over one of Africa’s seats on the Security Council in 1977 between Niger and
Nigeria, and which Nigeria won on the support by extra-African countries shows
the negative influence of small allies (Keohane. R. O. 1977:164-165).
The assertion that “African international politics can be
seen as power politics, marked by competition for leadership within regions and
on the continent as a whole “(Ojo. O, Orwa. D. K. et. al;1985:38) seems to
under cut the above realities. What has
probably mitigated the practice and struggle of realpolitik in the African
pecking order has been more of the intervention of external actors, which have
been encouraged by the lesser powers or the micro-States against regional
leaders than the absence of a dominant power.
Indeed, if the ‘unequal equal’ actors in Africa are considered along the
indicators of juridical statehood of Area or territory size, population and Gross National Product, certainly, there are
a lot of differences in national attributes.
These are regarded to have reflected in power capabilities and influence
of these actors. (Ojo. O, Orwa. DK. et.al, 1985:36).
The hierarchy of influence has been established with the over
all pattern of diplomatic exchange, as a mirror of the perceived power
relationships on the continent (Johns. D. 1979:268-83).
From the above study, it becomes highly visible that majority
of the micro-States are found in the Franco-phone group of States. It was like this in 1960s and was still true
in 1980s and are also reflective of the real situation in 1990s. A projection of the vertical linkage between
France and her former colonies has been
observed at the U. N General Assembly sessions;
“The franco-phone states gave their unconditional political
support to France, especially in the U. N. and on almost all major issues” (Akomolafe.
S. 1995:35), (Smouts M-C, 1980:349-364).
This good turn was based on the ability of France to actually
pick and choose government in franco-phone African countries, change them or
maintain them as it wished. (Akomolafe. S,
1995:35).
III-
AN EVALUATION OF THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE AFRICAN MICRO-STATES THROUGH THEIR
VOTING PATTERNS IN THE COLD WAR AND POST COLD WAR GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSIONS
Although Franco-phone African countries constitute the bulk
of the micro-States in Africa, Swaziland and Lesotho among others in the
southern African sub-region, Sierra Leone and the Gambia and the Lusophone
countries of Burkina Faso and Guinea fall into that category of weak States,
whose membership Secretary – General U. Thant believed weakened the United
Nations.
Lacking an independent existence in the period of the cold
war, and courted by the super powers and their allies, their role in
international politics outside the two blocs balance of power system was
minimal (Schou. A & Brundtland. A. O;1971).
Inspite of the non-aligned policy which attempted to separate former
colonial territories from their former colonial masters and allowing them to
play a role independent of that pursued by the former colonial powers. Micro-States remained self consciously
subservient to their former colonial or new masters, as they compromised their
commitment to non-alignment for the sake of economic advantages (MazruI. A,
1976:173). For franco-phone
micro-States, these appetising and compelling advantages included among other
things a haven of stability and growth provided by 45 years of unchanged parity
between the French Franc and the CFA franc which contained inflationary trends
for decades. After their belated
interest in the continent, the Americans, the Russians and the Chinese, leading actors in the cold war drama, offered
exciting incentives in the form of favourable trade and trade payments,
military assistance in the form of arms and military advisers for in addition
to other benefits, continuing support in the United Nations General Assembly,
where the numerical strength of African countries made even the micro-States,
votes worth courting.Continuing support on political issue in the international
forum was a pre-requisite for political, security, economic, Military and other
forms of super power support.
Thus, on issues like
disarmament, the elimination of arms, the spread of nuclear weapons, on the
arms race, the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Congo, Cuba and issues related to
South East Asia, Russia expected unconditional support from allies like Mali,
Niger, Sudan, Ghana and Ethiopia against the ‘West’. Similarly, both Peing and Moscow courted the
diplomatic support of their weak African States allies in their drawn out
rivalry over territorial claims, while the Americans and their western allies,
through the injection of massive economic and military assistance have
cultivated a group of client States, used in their diplomatic face ups in
international organisations particularly in their policy of containing the
expansionist policies of Moscow in Africa.
The value of micro-States support in
the General Assembly as anything more than moral fig leaves in the quest by
super powers for the endorsement of their positions on crucial international
issues is doubtful. Throughout the
period of the cold war, inspite of General Assembly Resolutions of various
persuasions, the possession of the veto by the five permanent members, have
allowed the U. N to continue to remain in the words of Monyiham;
“a grand institutional arrangement by which a handful
of Nations very much in the ascendant in world Affairs attempt to arrange their
affairs, so that their ascendancy should be enabled to persist (Monyiham. D,
1977:57).
Disregard for the
functional principle by the major powers has meant over the years that the
position of middle and micro-States have gone largely unrecognised.
On issues of common interest to the continent, micro-States
in Africa were however united in their
positions in the General Assembly debates of issues ranging from colonialism,
Decolonisation, Racial discrimination and Apartheid, Zionism and Economic Aid.
The balkanisation along ideological lines in 1963,
notwithstanding, the beginning of the harmonisation of the concerns of Africans
at the 1958 Conference of Independent African States and the 1960 Brazaville
meeting of francophone States was endorsed at Addis-Abeba. The co-ordinating committee of leaders of
delegates to the U. N and the secretariat of representatives of 4 African
countries which designed common continental positions to be adopted on critical
issues were the logical outcome of the Addis-Abeba position (Amate, C. OC,
1978:191).
United in the aversion to continuing colonialism and the
apartheid policies of South Africa, most African States, radical or moderate,
Cassablanca or Monrovia, pro-East or pro-West,
micro or middle power, supported by the Afro-Asian and members of the
non-aligned movement have by their votes in the General Assembly succeeded in
moving the United Nations from a conciliatory policy of pacific pressure,
adopted between 1945 to 1960, from Resolutions regretting, deploring and
depreciating, changing albeit increasingly in strong language, to Resolutions
condemning, isolating and boycotting her products. Many micro-States were among the 46
sponsoring Nations of the Draft Resolution, on apartheid calling for sanctions
at the 16th session of the General Assembly (MILLAR, 1967). The 2nd Resolution which finally
incorporated sanctions, Resolution 176 (XVII) adopted at the 17th
session, considered by some as the most severe resolution adopted in the
history of the General Assembly which called on the Security Council to
consider action under Article 6 of the Charter was also widely supported by
most African States. By 114 votes in
favour and 2 against, with 3 abstentions, the body also in 1966 voted to end
South Africa’s mandate over South West Africa putting the country directly
under U.N responsibility.
Increasingly however, a number of micro-States among them
Malawi and Mali were abstaining on a number of crucial votes in the General
Assembly and in the Security Council against South Africa. Malawi was becoming increasingly estranged
from the continental African body, because of its anti pan-African rhetorics
and close ties with Portugal, the then Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Both countries were the lone abstention
African votes against General Assembly Resolution and Security Council
Resolution 217 of November 20, 1965 and Resolution 221 of April 1961 calling
for economic sanctions against Rhodesia saw abstention vote by Mali
respectively (EZE. O, 1987:60). In
addition, also, with South Africa’s policy of destabilising the region and with
her concept of constellation of African States, a number of abstentions by
micro-States from the Southern African sub region were also recorded.
By 1967, Malawi had established diplomatic relations with
South Africa and economic benefits had followed, among these, a loan from South
Africa for the construction of a phase of the new capital Lilongwe, and
financial support for the construction of the Malawian section of the Ncala
link with Mozambique (Caputo. A. P,1971), (Joffee. S. H, 1973), (Chiyenbere. H,
1971), (Myall. J, 1970).
Warned by the South Africans not to push them to the
wall by his aggressive anti-apartheid rhetoric’s,
Jonathan’s Lesotho was probably one of the absenting countries at the U. N
General Assembly sessions where Resolutions on the apartheid enclave were
discussed (Arnold. G, 1979).
With the General Assembly having under its jurisdiction, the
committee on Disarmament and other issues related to it and matters relating to
the Granting of Independence, the Assembly became the centre ground for the
discussion of those issues (Adeniran. T, 1986).
Deteriorating economic conditions for most African
countries in the 1970s and 1980s, constrained their ability to meet their
contributory financial obligations to the U. N thus reducing further their
ability to vote independently (De Lavarene. C, 1995:61). In an organisation where there is always on
kind of reception of the other for diplomats, those representing these
micro-States of Africa become mostly the invited but never inviting anybody
because of their lean purses. Most
importantly, during an important voting session at the General Assembly or at
the Security Council, these same States become the ready targets of lobby and
it is not rare to learn that the debts owed by the representatives of these
States to the New York landlords become objects of trade by barter. Payments of these debts the powerful States
are made in exchange for their votes on the important issue(s) on the agenda (De
Lavarene. C, 1995:61).
Inspite of the bold attempts to reform their frail economies,
the debt burden and other financial facators impeded investments and economic
growth (Salim. S. A, Adiaye. B, Yaker. L; December 1992). Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, the Sudan,
Togo and Sierra Leone for example saw their GDP reduced from, 5.9%; 5.8%; 3.9%;
2.0%; 3.8%; 4.5%; and 2.6% in between 1965-1980 top 2.3%, 2.0%; 3.7%; 1.7%; 0.1%;
0.0% and 1.0% in the period 1980-1988 (Burnett. A, 1990:46). The decade of adjustment failed to create
sustained development or reduced trade imbalances (Hellinger.D & Hammond.
R, 1994:52-53). A number of factors have
also diverted much needed cash for developmental and diplomatic
obligations. Raising fratricidal civil
wars and inter-States conflicts in Liberia (1990-1995), Sierra Leone, (the
rebel atrocities of RUF), Uganda, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Burundi, Somalia, Mali
and Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali (1985, left many micro-States strapped for
cash as their countries witnessed phenomenal increases in military
expenditure. Uganda, Ethiopia, Burundi,
Sudan, Mali and Rwanda spent in 1987, between 8.8% and 1.6% of the GDP/GNP on
defence expenditure (Burnett. A, 1990:138).
The problem is compounded by the
fact that a number of these micro-States, identified by the IMF and World Bank
as Severely Indebted, Low Income Countries, spend between 54.5% (Uganda) to
7.6% (Gabon) of their foreign exchange earnings on debt servicing. (Adekanye, J.B.1993:63).
The cost of rehabilitating displaced peoples within
boundaries, or refugees from outside and the huge amounts needed for
reconstruction after years of war have also strained the financial resources of
weak States. These have to be done in
the context of reduced foreign aid for
humanitarian or developmental purppses, a feature of the post cold war and post
communist era.
The collapse of communism in the East, ended the bipolarity
and super powers rivalry in global politics.
The consequences of these for micro States are far-reaching. It has meant the diversion of Western
investment capital to countries of Eastern Europe, while Soviet economic
collapse have deprived her former allies in Africa of some of the largess they
once enjoyed; these have limited substantially, the sources of aid available to
micro-States dependent on foreign aid for economic survival, at a time when
most are experiencing trying economic times.
Competing demands from Russia and countries of Eastern Europe, and for
South Africa for Western aid, and the linkage established between aid and human
rights, economic mismanagement and democracy concerns by the west in
co-operation with non Governmental aid agencies.
Lastly, the 1994 devaluation of the currency in the 14
nations strong CFA Zone, on the orders of the IMF and the World Bank left many
in the Zone, in deep economic and financial crises, in spite of the special
French fund for Development which provided cash donations to members to cushion
the pains of devaluation, and adjustment.
(West Africa, 15 December
1994:741), (West Africa. 8-14 May,
1995:716).
As some of the world’s Least Developed Countries, with few
resources to change their economic situation in a world entrenching inequitable
terms of trade, with former donors increasingly reluctant to ‘buy’ their
support for their diplomatic support, financial obligations to regional and
international organizations are becoming early casualties, in cuts on
government spending of most micro-States.
In West Africa, for, example, the non-payment of statutory
contributions by a number of those micro States are among the factors
strangulating the organisations. Only
Niger, Nigeria and the Cote d’Ivoire for example, paid their annual contributions
for 1984, with others owing the regional body (ECOWAS) contributions for 8
years. Unpaid annual contributions,
amounting to about $77,500,000 also forced the suspension of 1994 OAU
programmes and left the organization’s financial situation in an alarming state
(KESSINGS, November 1994:4026).
In the United Nations, where contributions are decided on the
basis of capacity to pay and where capacity determines the level of influence,
many micro-States among them, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Djibouti,
Gambia, Malawi, Mauritius, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal and Sierra Leone, are deemed
to be capable of paying only 0.01% as their annual contributions. Western countries like the US Who contribute
most to UN funds are therefore legitimately allowed to dominate and influence
the direction of the activities of the organization (Eze. O, 1987).
The economic crisis is also affecting the ability of the
small States to maintain a diplomatic presence in the United Nations. Reported cases of mission unable to maintain
offices and residential accommodation of mission staff have been made and new
methods are being used to entice micro-State to support rich-Nations on issues
of interest to them. (De Lavarene. C,
1995:61).
On the other hand, insignificant attention is being paid to
critical issues concerning Africa in general and micro-States in particular
under the guise of donor fatigue or moral disengagement. Human tragedies, in Rwanda, Liberia, Sudan,
Somalia, Burundi and Sierra Leone, identified by Boutrous Ghali as the orphaned
conflicts, have been ignored largely by the UN’s ‘promiscuous and selective
attention span’ (Ignatieff. M, 1995:33).
After 6 years of conflict in Liberia, which left hundreds of
people killed and half of the population displaced and in spite of the Ugandan
foreign secretary Kwanga Semogerere’s call and the 47th session of
the General Assembly for the U.N to assist in ending the long drawn out
conflict, the body after its belated support for the peace process have failed
to end the civil war both in Liberia and Sierra Leone.
Similarly, four months of mindless violence which left 30,000
mostly children killed and hundreds more wounded and displaced by March 1992,
failed to attract the attention of U. N.
Instead, it forced the withdrawal of UN humanitarian involvement in some
parts of the country. U.N full engagement
in Somalia started in earnest in 1992 (West Africa
(London) June 1995:876-877).
Other ‘orphaned conflicts’ consigned to their fate and which were
largely ignored by the U.N, were the Ugandan crisis, the humanitarian crisis.
Increasingly, the U. N influenced by the Western world has
been paying scant attention to its developmental role, particularly as these
affect the neediest member States, the microStates in Africa.
CONCLUSION
The chapter carried out a preliminary
examination of the performances of African microStates at the United Nations’
General Assembly sessions. It attempted
an evaluation of the contributions of this category of States through their
voting patterns in the cold war and post cold war era.
It
presents the discovery that the relative status of the micro-States limits the
margin of manoeuvring possible in their performances most especially during the
cold war period and now in the post cold war era. This discovery puts the question of the weakening
of the U. N system by these categories of States back into prominence.
The
study concludes by proposing that the African micro-States need be encouraged
to take sub-regional organizations more seriously and from their participation
therein bow to realism by allowing the actual or potential regional leaders to
represent them at the U. N. If this
arrangement could work, then the United Nations system would be better off in
terms of adherence to its developmental objectives with regards to the African
Micro-States.
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