STRENGTHENING THE
LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTION FOR DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN NIGERIA
By
*Olufemi Patrick ADELUSI, Ph.D.
Tel: +447944419861
And
**Ajinde OLUWASHAKIN, Ph.D
Tel.
(+234)8060328426
And
***Ayodeji Awopeju. Msc
Department of Political
Science,
College of Social and
Management Sciences,
Joseph Ayo Babalola, University,
Ikeji-Arakeji, Osun State,
Nigeria.
Tel.(+234)8034482689
|
|
STRENGHENING
THE LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTION FOR DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN NIGERIA
ABSTRACT
The Legislature is about the
weakest of the three arms of government in new democracies, hence, the
imperative for its strengthening. Therefore, the paper argues that one of the
salient ways of strengthening the Legislative institution for democratic consolidation
is the creation of awareness of the dual roles of parliament both as a
representative assembly and as an arm of government.It posits that Democratic
Consolidation entails the affirmation of the right of the people to development
through political participation and emancipated civil society.The paper then
explores the various forms in which the Parliament at the Federal level could
work with other arms of government to achieve for Nigerians the desired social,
political and economic developments.The paper concludes on the premise that
harmonious working relationship between the Parliament and the other arms of
government is very essential for the needed elite consensus on the
developmental goals within the context of a reformation agenda. As it should be
realized that there is no perfect democracy, rather effort is required to have
a workable democracy that would require evidential reformative agenda for
consolidation.
1. INTRODUCTION
Between 1945 and 1990, the period
generally referred to as the Cold War, many countries in Eastern Europe, Latin
America, Asia, and Africa were mostly under authoritarian regimes. However, the
wave of change brought down many of these regimes in the 1990s to the spread of
democracy in many countries, particularly in Africa. Most developing countries,
like Nigeria that embrace democracy, often face many challenges as they shake
off authoritarian past, to consolidate their democratic gains. In 2009, Freedom
House reported that 116 countries out of 194 qualified as “partially free”;
meaning that those countries have not fully consolidated their democracies (http://www.ehow.com/list-7270625_issues_democratic-consolidation-html,accessed11/4/2011).The
51 years of Nigeria’s existence as a State in the process of becoming a nation
had witnessed less than 19years of democratic rule. What constitutes the 19
years is the uninterrupted years of the current fourth republic and the aller-retour of military dispersed
uncoordinated civilian rule. The military being no firm believer in the
principles of separation of powers or checks and balances saw in the
legislature one of its primary targets of assault whenever power is seized. The
Legislature was in abeyance for 30 years as a result of prolonged military
rule.
The twelve years of civilian rule
(1999-2012) have witnessed an attempt at democratic consolidation. The democratic
institutions created by the 1999 Constitution have been working, to some extent,but the pluralistic nature of the
Nigerian society has not made its impact felt by the imposed 1999 Constitution.
In other words, the provisions of the 1999 Constitution are wantonly inimical to
democratic culture and consolidation.
The executive arm strengthened by
legacy of military rule carried out the arm-twisting tactics into the
democratic space during the early stage of the Fourth Republic from 1999-2007.
However, the legislature as the elected body to articulate the people’s
opinions, hopes and aspirations had become progressively exposed to and
stronger in law-making and oversight capacities. The advent of President
Yar’Adua’s administration in 2007,attenuated the over-bearing attitude of the
Executive. Hence there is need for creating enabling environments to ensure
that legislatures can adequately perform their mandated functions and
responsibilities (http://www.packworld.org
/cs/international_legislative_strengthening_thml. Accessed 11/18/2011).
Our understanding of Democratic
Consolidation is that in which the democratic institutions which are put in
place for political participation of all segments of the country are allowed to
freely work in order that the resolution of developmental problems are
achieved, and the rule of law is adhered to. The paper begins from the premise
that one of the salient paths to strengthening the legislative institution for
democratic consolidation is the creation of awareness of the dual roles of the
parliament both as a representative assembly and as an arm of
government.Accordingly, the paper is divided into the following parts, namely:
first, this introductory part; second, a theoretical focus; third, the
parliament as an arm of government with the areas of challenges; fourth, the
parliament as a representative assembly, with the areas of challenges, and the
conclusion.
2. A
Theoretical Focus
The term democratic consolidation, was originally
coined to describe the challenge “of making new democracies secure, of
extending their life expectancy beyond the short term, of making them immune
against the threat of authoritarian regression, of building dams against
eventual ‘reversal waves.’” (Schelder, 1964).
Consolidation
by itself revolves round theoretical templates, namely, institutionalization,
informal rules, and civic culture. As the main focus of this paper is on the
Legislative institution, theinstitutionalization aspect is closely examined.
Some writers reason that the process through which a democracy attains
consolidation entails the creation and improvement of secondary institutions of
the democracy. Linz and Stephen assert that democracy is consolidated by the
presence of the institutions supporting and surrounding elections (for
instance, the rule of law). (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_consolidation).
By democratic consolidation,
therefore, we mean the process of strengthening the democratic institutions, by
heading off any reversal to authoritarianism. In this regard, there are several
issues in democratic consolidation, notably credible elections, respect for
human rights, maintaining a robust economy, among others. Strengthening
democratic institutions, particularly the Legislature, goes beyond mere bricks
and mortar buildings, rather it involves the ways and norms of doing things. It
is not enough for a country to give the people the liberty of expression and
holding regular elections, but more so in adherence to the rule of law.
In this respect, the
legislature as an institution requires fortification to in turn consolidate the
democratic process. The need to strengthen the Legislature is borne out of the
fact that “the fragmented character of assemblies weakens their capacity to
provide leadership and take concerted action.” This has become more acute in an
age in which the people look to government to solve social and economic
problems, and in which states have no choice but to play crucial roles in
global affairs and politics. How then can the Legislature be strengthened to
become stronger, more effective, democratic institution in playing its expected
roles?
3. Strengthening the Parliament as an Arm of Government
with the Areas of Challenges
The
Parliament in the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria
The 1999 amended Constitution of
Nigeria in Chapter V, Part I Section, A
47 – 51 prescribes the composition and staff of the National Assembly.
SectionB 52-64 states the Procedures
for summoning and dissolution of National Assembly. Section C 65-70 prescribes the Qualifications for
membership of National Assembly and Right of Attendance, while Section E 80-89 states its Powers and control
over Public funds.
It has to be stated that the roles
of the parliament prescribed above are similar to those of the Houses of
Assembly at the State level. The National Assembly, however, is the concern in
this study, with the understanding that the analysis may be applied at the
other levels. It is noteworthy that all the five sections of the Part 1 of the Chapter
V elaborately stated above need a second look with the expectation for
recommendation on their consolidation.
The items under Section A which are about the Composition
and staff of the National Assembly,Sections
47-49 are in order. Nigeria adopts a National Assembly which is bi-camera
as stipulated in section 47; while
the composition, of three senators from each state or 109 senators as presently
constituted for the red chamber;and the
Three Hundred and Sixty (360) membersthat make up the House of Representatives
– the green chamber, will add up to
Four Hundred and sixty nine (469) members, representing 167 million Nigerians. Given this composition of the membership of
National Assembly, what is desirable is not to allow the representatives remain
without agenda setting – with civil
society groups working along with them.
Section B with items
on the Procedures for summoning and dissolution of National Assembly would need
some attention given to its contents. Indeed, section B64 on Dissolution and Proclamation needs to have a
specified date inputted; the 5thof June of the year can be retained as it is
presently. Sections C and D on
Qualifications for membership of National Assembly and Right of Attendance, and
those items on Elections to National Assembly are still valid and democracy
friendly; though 66 (f) may be
modified to include leave of absence for interested public sector workers who
have indicated willingness to participate in partisan politics.
Central to our discussion on
strengthening the parliament as an arm of government, is section E of this part I, contains power and control over public funds. This power which is often
referred to as “the chief power”of the powers of Congress of the United States of America has also been referred to
as “power over purse”. Section E 80 (1) – (4) expressly established a
Consolidated Revenue Fund for the federation, which simply can be referred to
as the Public Funds from where all the activities of the Federal government
could be funded. Section 80(3)-(4) gave this power, thus:
Section
80(3): No moneys shall be withdrawn from any public funds of the federation,
other than the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation, unless the issues
of those moneys have been authorized by an Act of the National Assembly.
Section
80 (4): No moneys shall be withdrawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund or any
other public fund of the federation except in the manner prescribed by the National
Assembly. (FGN Printer, 1999).
Accordingly, the Constitution placed
the power of authorization of expenditure from the Consolidated Revenue Fund on
the shoulders of the Parliament in Section 81 (1) – (2). It made it mandatory
for the Executive, headed by the President, to cause the Appropriation Bill to
be prepared and laid before the Legislature.
(The
Appropriation Bill is the instrument of the Executive’s plans for the
running of government within the relevant fiscal year).
The power of authorization of
expenditure is followed by the power to conduct investigations where:
Section 88 1(a) & (b and
2 (a) & (b), states subject to the provisions of this constitution each House of the
National Assembly shall have power by resolution published in its Journal or in
the official Gazette of the Government of the Federation to direct or cause to
be directed an investigation into the conduct of affairs of any person,
authority,ministry or government department charged or intended to be charged,
with the duty of or responsibility for disbursing or administering moneys
appropriated or to be appropriated by the National Assembly (FGN Printer, 1999).
The role and power of the
legislature over appropriations have served to illustrate how important the
legislature is as an arm of government. It is expected to make laws for the
peace, order and good government of the state
as appropriate. The above illustration exposes Nigerian National Assembly
to some critical deficiencies in carrying out these roles, which can be
referred to as areas of challenges.
4. Areas of
Challenges in the Exercise of the Parliamentary Role as an Arm of Government
Political
Situation
The political context of the first
Parliament of the Fourth Republic is instructive. As there was a rush for
military disengagement, this necessitated elections without adequate provision
for the individual legislator’s office accommodation and staff offices. Accordingly, remuneration, emolument, and housing
accommodation issues dominated the discourse. The National Assembly complex
barely had offices for principal officers. This lacuna may have been overcome
with new buildings added to the initial edifice hosting the National Assembly
under the second administration of the Fourth Republic, from 2007. During the
period, there was preponderance of motions being passed instead of Bills. Crash
programmes on legislative studies were half hazardlyorganised internally and
externally. The obvious consequences of these infrastructure deficiencies were
the bickering among the legislators in each house / chamber and between the
National Assembly and the Executive.
Power of
Appropriation
The power over purse accorded the
legislature could not be exercised effectively as the executive carried over
the military government experience of diktat
into democratic space. The first and second administrations under the Fourth
Republic, shared this same attribute. There has never been a rancorous free
Appropriation Bill passage and added to this context was open charges and
counter charges of corruption between the Parliament and the Executive. It is noteworthy
that if there is urgent need for elite consensus, it is most needed at this
level of Executive – Legislative relations on the passage of the Appropriation
Bills, and more rigorous oversight for appropriate Acts, particularly budgetary
implementations.
Concentration
of Power at the Centre
Another area of challenge is the
over concentration of legislative powers at the Centre, in which 68 items have
been attracted to the Centre. The Centre need not have more than 32 items for a
balanced Federation. It is elite consensus that can really appreciate the need
to avoid over concentration of Legislative powers at the Centre in a federation.
What can be described as Nigeria’s pseudo
and unbalanced federation may rather weaken than strengthen the legislature.
Legislative
Image
The National Assembly marked the end
of its ninth session in the 10 years of
unbroken democratic / civilian rule, in the third term of the PDP –led Federal
Government in June 2009. Moreover, the unbroken string continued into the
fourth term of the PDP – led Federal Government which ushered in the Seventh
National Assembly in April 2011.Along the arguments posited by this paper, the
leaders of the bi-cameral legislature- President of the Senate, Ken Nnamani and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Aminu Bello Masari, both of 1999-2007
administration and BankoleDimeji of 2007-2010 administration, respectively
stressed “the need for the nation to have an independent and virile legislature
to safeguard democracy in the country.” (The
Punch, November 12, 2007:4). In the same vein, the Seventh Assembly under
the leadership of President of the Senate, David Mark (2007-2015) and the
Speaker, House of Representatives, AminuTambuwal (2011-2015), all would concur
on the need to have an independent and strong legislature to consolidate democratic
gains thus far in Nigeria.
Specifically speaking, during his
tenure, Senator Ken Nnamani urged his colleagues to safeguard the integrity of
the legislature, because the demise of the legislature would mark the death of
democracy. The Speaker of Osun State House of Assembly, Adejare Bello,
(2007-2010) administration spoke in the same vein that “Democracy is about the
parliament. If you remove parliament, then there is no democracy” (Sunday Punch,(Lagos), April 19, 2009:1).
The position of the legislators was
founded on the knee-Jerk and denigration the National Assembly was subjected to
by one of President Obasanjo’s broadcasts in which members of the National
Assembly were accused of corruption.
Moreover, it must be mentioned here
that the Senate reacted negatively to the refusal of the Executive to implement
the 2005 Appropriation Act as passed. This made the Executive to accept the
wisdom of the Senate that it could not unilaterally tamper with the budget
without legislative permission.
Epileptic Funding
Oneother area of challenge to be considered for strengthening the
Parliament is “the area of epileptic release of funds.” According to Hon. Bello
Masari, “the epileptic release of funds to the National Assembly had in many
ways adversely affected the work of the House.” Expatiating further, he said
that the existing practice of charging the emoluments of the National Assembly
on the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the federation, subject to the discretionary
approval of the executive arm of the government, contradicts that principle of
separation of powers and continues to militate against the full growth and
maturity of the parliament (The Punch,(Lagos), June 3, 2005:7).
It has been advocated that a law be
made by the National Assembly, creating its own service commission autonomous
of the Federal Civil Service Commission, to be known as “the National Assembly
Service Commission”. Accompanying this law also is that which seeks the
charging of the funds allocated to the National Assembly direct to consolidated fund without the Executive
control and supervision. However, the creation of the National Assembly Service
Commission should enjoyautonomy of the Federal Civil Service. This and the
first charge on consolidated fund for direct funding of the National Assembly
might involve constitutional amendment.
Corruption
and the Cost of Governance
The issue of corruption in the
Assembly must be taken seriously, both administrative and financial corruption.
Legislators must be persons of credible credentials and above board in handling
monetary matters. Some members of the Legislature between 1999 and 2009 have
been charged for certificate forgery and financial misappropriation, or
outright embezzlement. Equally indicting is the charge by the Central Bank of
Nigeria (CBN) that the overhead for the National Assembly was about 25 per cent
of the National Budget. Regardless of the denials by the Assembly, other
notable authorities have corroborated the financial recklessness associated
with the Nigerian Legislature. (The
Legislative Assembly and You,(Ikeji) 2011, pp.
27-29). This will require curtailment to truly make the Legislature honourable
and strengthen its capacity as democratic institution.
In this respect, some experts have
advocated for a “Part-time Legislature.” In an address entitled: “A call for
the Abolition of Full-Time Legislature,” Tyodza Atim said: “Nigeria should
redefine and restructure her democracy by making the legislative arm of government
part-time. The sitting of various Houses at the National, State and Local
Council levels should only be five times in a year.” (The Guardian (Lagos), December 12, 2010).
Although Atim did not limit his advocacy
to the Legislature alone, however, the focus of this paper is on this arm of
government. Broadly though, the high cost of governance is not too helpful for
the sustenance of democracy. It is hard to imagine how a democracy can be
consolidated when resources that would have been invested in improving decayed
infrastructure and the development of basic socio-economic amenities are
“wastefully expended on salaries and allowances of legislators.” (The Guardian, December 12, 2010). A
Legislature considered by the people as a leech
has no place of honor or strength. Moreover, where there is socioeconomic
discontent among the people there is bound to be disruption and instability
within the polity.
In a more critical sense, how can
Nigeria “restructure her democracy by making the legislative arm of government
part-time” without weakening the legislative institution rather than
strengthening it? And if the legislative institution is rendered weak, as
working on part-time could be a disincentive to hard work, and invariably
weaken democracy instead of consolidate it, then a new snag in democratic
consolidation is lurking.Therefore, the path of honor and fairness is the way
to go by appropriating what is right for all by “legislative re-design.”
Such a legislative re-design or
reformation will take cognizance, first and foremost the well-being of the
people they represent in the people’s parliament. The legislative re-design
will take the form of ethical rebirth, regeneration devoid of the spirit of
greed and senseless accumulation. Elected or selected representatives have no
right to lord it over their electors. Rather, there should be a form of
egalitarian interaction and balance between the representatives (legislators)
and their constituencies (electorates). Such interaction and balance would
ensure strength and consolidation of electoral democracy. A United Nations
Development Programme and National Democratic Institute (UNDP/NDI) discourse
had focused on this aspect of Strengthening
the Legislature – Challenges and Techniques.It takes a process-oriented
approach to representation by looking at three all-important components: “the
capacity of representatives to engage constituents, the capacity of
constituents to engage their representatives, and the legal and political
framework within which this engagement takes place.” (http://www.gsdrc.org/go/topic-guides/political-systems/effective-legislature-legislatures) (Accessed
11/18/2011).
5. Strengthening
the Parliament as a Representative Assembly within the Areas of Challenge
We have stated at the beginning of
this discourse that the parliament serves dual purposes, namely: as an arm of a
government and as a representative assembly. Most times, the first role
occupied the parliament to the exclusion of the other. There is basically no
mutual exclusivity in the two tasks. By carrying out effectively its role as an
arm of government, the aspect of being a responsive representative assembly could
also have been taken care of. It is important for us to throw light on the
representative assembly role of the parliament and how it could be strengthened
the more, in terms of the quality of leadership they provide.
Leadership
A statement credited to John Stuart
Mill in 1862 describes the legislature as the people’s representatives. He stated:
The
proper office of a representative assembly is to watch and control the
government, to throw the light of publicity on its acts, to compel a full
exposition and justification of all of them which any one considers
questionable, to censure them if found condemnable …. In addition to this, the
Parliament has an office … to be at once the nation’s committee of Grievances
and its Congress of opinions. (Leautier F.A, 2002: 180).
One can deduce from the above that
the legislator is a leader of his people. This kind of leadership entails among
other functions, being in touch with the people, that is, the constituency. It
is expected that legislators need to have functional/operational offices in
their constituencies. The purpose for which such an office is mandatory is to
allow legislators to stay in constant touch with the people. It is from among
the constituents that the legislators got elected. There is an evolving relationship
between the legislature and the constituency. At present, of the 109 Senators
and the 360 representatives, few of them, could
their constituencies attest to having been mobilized towards a cause that is
central to resolving their welfare problems. The constituency offices should
serve as people’s parliament and address issues that have direct impact on
their lives and the overall development of the area.
Just as the question keeps popping
up as to whether the National Legislator is responsible to the country, the
state or even the party, so does the question of relevance of the legislators
to solving individual, group or party problems still disturbing the minds of
electorates at the constituency level. Indeed, other questions arise as to how does
the legislator handles the differences in the constituency and resolve the
potential conflicts between competing interests in the nation and even within
his own constituency? Again, if he / she loses the confidence of the
constituency, is he/she obliged to resign? How empowered is the constituency in
the principle of recall? Section 69
of the 1999 Constitution provides a right to recall a member of the National Assembly.
This provision could be said to demonstrate the practical application of the
impact of the constituency on the activities of the Legislature. It is the
members of the Legislator’s constituency that are empowered to set in motion
the process for recalling a legislator.
Section 69 provides that a
legislator may be recalled, if,
(a) There is petition
to the chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission a petition in
that behalf signed by more than one-half of the persons registered to vote in
that member’s constituency alleging their loss of confidence in that member,
and
(b) The petition
is thereafter in a referendum conducted by the Independent National Electoral
Commission within 90 days of the date of receipt of the petition, approved by a
simple majority of the votes of the persons registered, to write in that
member’s constituency (FGN Printer,
1999).
It must be borne in mind that the
above area of recall came from the Political Bureau instituted in 1987. The rationale
for such clauses was informed by the fact that a “a culture of consultation and
reciprocal control with regard to law making and the use of power and
privileges,” is critical to responsive democratic practice.
It is not in order to think that
there is a belief that Nigerians have by now an idea of the goals of nationhood
and the objectives of representatives. The inclusion of the section above in
the 1999 Constitution found support in the observation of Tip O’Neil, a one-time
Speaker of the United State House of Representatives, when he spoke of the
vital truth in which “the whole point of having a Congress is that the
representatives of the people are accountable to their constituencies.”
(Ornstein N, 1992).Thus, the power of recall should serve:
(a) As a
constant reminder to the legislator of the people whose interest is mandatedly represented
and
(b) To develop
a culture of consultation with the constituency.
Essence of
Legislative Strengthening
The essence of the advocacy on
legislative strengthening is to make the legislature become stronger, more
effective, democratic institution. And this can be done through programmes and
activities which are designed to:
·
Increase transparency,
·
Accountability,
·
Strengthen public participation and representation,
·
Build public policy,
·
Law-making, and
·
Oversight capacities.
For legislatures to properly perform
the above mandated functions and responsibilities, enabling, environments are
required that would:
·
Support efforts to create a constitutional and legal
framework
·
Build broad public support for the legislature through
working with civil society and media groups.
·
Promote recognition on behalf of other government
bodies, of the critical role of representative bodies in a democratic society.
Towards achieving these goals, the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) identifies and seeks
to promote three primary functions of democratic legislature: “representation
of the wishes of the citizens in policymaking, lawmaking and oversight of the
implementation of laws, policies and programs,” of government (http://www.pactworld.org/cs/international_
legislative_strengthening_thml) (Accessed 11/18/2011). This, we
believe, is part of the efforts of the overall strengthening of legislature for
democratic consolidation, particularly in new democracies.
Information
Imperative
Information is power and this
cannot be over emphasized in the issue of democratic consolidation. The passage
of the Freedom of Information Bill (FOI) was a great stride towards democratic
consolidation. The Bill was signed into law by President Goodluck Jonathan on May 30, 2011, and thus becoming an
Act. According to a member of the Federal House of Representatives,
MrsAbikeDabiri – Erewa:
The
FOI Act instigates key democratic functioning, by forcing government to operate
more efficiently and transparently, while simultaneously inspiring citizens to
become active participants in the civic process … . So we have to learn how to
make our government accountable, because this Act makes it possible for every
Nigerian to seek information on how our government is using our resources. (The
Punch (Lagos) July 21, 2011, p.14).
She affirms that the Freedom of
Information Act will deepen democracy if fully implemented.
In addition, when the legislative
institution is strengthened to perform its constitutional responsibilities,
particularly the power of appropriation and oversight of policy implementations
will go a long way in prompting the Executive to deliver on implementation of
policies and goals such as achieving growth and welfare for the Nigerian people
(Bankole, 2009). Such will help to curb the high incidents of ethno–religious
and communal violence, stem the tide of violent extremism like the Boko Haram phenomenon, and give
democracy the resilience it possesses to thrive in a fluid political and social
environment like ours.
Finally, the print and electronic
media have to devote greater
attention to issues raised at the public hearings on Bills in the Parliament.
This would enhance the parliament’s publicity and also increase the interest of
the public in matters slated for hearing
that concern them. Certainly, the willingness of a growing number of Assemblies
to open up their proceedings to television cameras has helped to raise their
public profiles and strengthen them as fora of debate and agencies of oversight
(Heywood, 2000:354). Scholars and researchers should not be left out as repertoire
of data for prompt analysis of policy formation and implementation. The actualization
of the power of recall of legislators cited in Section 69, for example, poses a
challenge here. The major challenge is that of the relevance of an accurate
voters’ register by which appropriate members of the electorate can be
identified. (Guobadia D.A. 2001). There is no gain saying of the fact that the
whole process of recall could be bedeviled by fraud, victimization and undue
influence on the process of getting the machinery in motion.
Conclusion
In this discourse, we have highlighted
the areas of challenges in the dual roles of the parliament that are worthy of
consideration and suggestions for strengthening the legislature towards
democratic consolidation. It was stated that democratic consolidation deals
with people’s participation in governance. The institutional mechanism for
people’s participation is the parliament. The fact was demonstrated that the
constituency sends representative to the parliament and that the lack of organized
and sustainable relationship between the representatives and their
constituencies is a major setback to democratic consolidation (Guobadia D.A.
2001).
It has been advocated that the focused
areas of challenges confronting the legislative institution in its dual roles
of serving as an arm of government and a representative assembly need to be
resolved. It has been argued that surmounting the challenges, would in part
strengthen the legislative institution and help consolidate democracy which is
a means towards achieving an all roundstability and developmental goals for the
country.
One may ask: whose duty would the
strengthening of the legislative institution be for democratic consolidation? The
answer is not a simple one. Without being pretentious of other likely answers,
we might look at the issue this way: The civil society at the level of the
constituencies would need greater sensitization, call it advocacy, on the
values of electing acceptable community-based individuals who have proven their
commitment to their communities and their development. Clearly, the
non-governmental agencies, devoted to socio-economic and human rights are in a
better position to sensitize the civil society into electing representatives
that would be close to actualizingtheir aspirations. The political parties are
also to recruit its membership along the same lines. The essence of this is to
guarantee the election of people who live and share the aspirations of their
communities (Guobadia, D.A. 2001).
Next to the contributions of the
civil society, is that of the media. The media has a great role to play. It can
start with great agenda setting. The various sessions of local council
assemblies, State Houses of Assembly and those of the National Assembly
chambers could be covered for public interest. In fact, dedicated print and
electronic media programmes, and publications are needed for reaching out to
the constituents and from them shall all their demands and support be passed on
or reflected upon. With the instrument of FOI Act at their disposal, the media
as the Fourth Estate of the realm, a watchdog, has the responsibility to
investigate and publish accurate information necessary for good governance and
development.
The organized private sector
working in collaboration with specialized faculties of social sciences of
tertiary institutions, training and management Centers can uplift the level of debates and proceedings coming out from
the various legislative institutions in the country. Research findings into
behavioural (political, economic and social) patterns likely to foster
democratic practices could be disseminated to the public at large through
sponsored publications and news bulletins and programmes. In pursuance of this,
whenever there appears an erosion of democratic values, this will necessarily
call for a reform agenda in the system. Reform invigorates, making democracy to
become better, freer, more participatory, more accountable, more competitive,
and more responsive (Diamond, 2008:369).
Finally, strengthening the
legislative institution for democratic consolidation would be realizable only
if the main areas of challenges observed with regards to its dual roles as an
arm of government and as a representative assembly are tackled holistically.
REFERENCES
Adejare, Bello (2009), “Presiding over a Parliament
is like tending mad people” in Sunday
Punch (Lagos), 19 April p.1.
Bankole, Dimeji (2007), “Executive influence killed
past Legislatures” In Business day (Lagos), November 12, p.4
Bankole, Dimeji (2009), “The Role of the Legislature
in the Consolidation of Democracy in Nigeria.” (http://www.themaceonline.com/pub/index.php?view=articleαcatiα=5:a...) (Accessed 11/18/2011).
Diamond, Larry (2008), The Spirit of Democracy,New York: Times Books/Henry Holt and
Company, p. 369.
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PRINTER, Lagos, (1999), Federal Republic Nigeria Official Gazette. No 27, Vol. 86. 5th
May. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Promulgation) Decree.
Guobadia, D.A. (2001). “The legislature and Good
Governance under the 1999 Constitution” in LannreIdowu (ed). The Media and the Legislature.NGE.Iganmu.
Lagos. P. 20.
Heywood, Andrew (2007), Politics, Third Edition, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 354.
“International Legislative Strengthening Technical
Assistance Service.”Pact
2011.(http://www.pactworld.org/cs/international_legislative_strengthenig _a.)
(Accessed 11/18/2011).
Leauther, F.A. (2002). “Parliaments and Poverty:
Building the Capacity to tackle the Problems” in The Parliamentarian: Journal of the Parliaments of the
Commonwealth. Issue Two. LXXXIII p. 180.
Linz and Consolidated Democracies (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_conslidation) (Retrieved August 12,
2011).
Na’abba, Ghali Umar (2003). “The Valedictory Address
by the Honourable Speaker of House of Presentatives to mark the end of the
first Assembly of the fourth Republic” 2 June.http://www/speaker-nass-nig.org.
Ornstein, N. (1992). “The Role of the Legislature in
Democracy” in Freedom Papers USIA.
“Role and Status of National Legislature.”The Legislative Assembly and You.Vol. 1
Issue 1, 2011.thelegislativeassemblyandyou@gmail.com.
Schedler, Andreas (1998), “What is Democratic
Consolidation?” Journal of Democracy,
Volume 9, November 2, April 1998, pp. 91-107.
THE PUNCH (Lagos) (2005); “Nnamani,
Masari Call for virile Legislature” 3 June; p.7.
This is a well-researched article worthy of commendation!
ReplyDelete