Thursday, 24 October 2013

NIGERIA AND FRANCE IN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF SPILL-OVER EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC INTO POLITICAL RELATIONS



NIGERIA AND FRANCE IN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF SPILL-OVER EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC INTO POLITICAL RELATIONS

                                            

                                                   By

                        Olufemi P. Adelusi (Ph.D)

INTRODUCTION

Political and economic relations between Nigeria and France since 1970 had developed on unequal basis (GambarI, Ibrahim 1987:239-248) many activities were witnessed in the economic relations sector (Ibrahim, Jibrin 1986:21) while the political relations had been cordial.

Nigeria’s need to diversify its trading and economic partners in terms of markets for its crude oil exports and foreign joint investments as well as France’s search for bigger markets for her finished manufactured products on one hand and her need to diversify her sources of petroleum imports from the turbulent Middle Eastern sources, all contributed to fostering the economic relations between Nigeria and France.

In what way has the important economic relations between Nigeria and France spilled over to their political and diplomatic relations?

It is our intention in this chapter to provide answer to this question by analysing Nigeria-France relations in Chadian crisis of the seventies and the eighties.


CHAD IN NIGERIAN AND FRENCH POLICY PERCEPTIONS


The Chadian crisis can be considered above all an internal problem linked to nation building process going on inside the country.  This process cannot but reveal the heterogeneous nature of the ethnic groups composing Chadian State, the unequal political participation as well as the unequal level of internal economic development among the different regions inside the country.

Nigeria considers the Chadian internal affairs; this Nigerian position was aided by Chadian authorities’ attitude.  They gave the impression of being able to put things under control as long as they could depend on French military and technical aid (Nwokedi, Emeka 1984:27)  Nevertheless, it is on record that the Nigerian authorities has been following attentively the Chadian affair.  If it is true that Nigeria never had any clearly defined policy towards Chad in early 1970s (Ibid:25) indeed,  Nigeria had demonstrated her fears as regards the presence of French troops in Chad as far back as 1969 ( Fawole,W.A. 1981 –1983:96-97).

Consequently, Nigerian government under General Gowon engaged in discussions in 1970 with the then Chadian head of State, Tombalbaye at Maiduguri (Nigeria) in order to find means of resolving the Chadian crisis as well as putting an end to the presence of foreign troops stationed in Chad.

Nigeria’s interest in seeing to the evacuation of foreign troops from the neighbouring countries lies in he preoccupation with territorial and national security especially when it still exists a fragile national consensus as well as peace in the country.  Thus we consider Nigeria’s intervention in the Chadian crisis in terms of national security imperatives7  (Ibid: 97)

Being a member of the O. A. U. mediation committee charged with the resolution of boundary conflicts involving Libya and Chad, Nigeria had been following with keen interest the evolution of the Chadian crisis since 1977.  It was not until 1978, that she was directly involved in Chad following the French and Swiss call on her assistance in rescuing their two citizens taken as hostages in the lake Chad region by the Troisieme Armee du FROLINAT (.Daniel Bach, 1984:125-126)

Seeing this Nigeria’s intervention being a success, the French foreign Affairs minister at the time, Mr. Louis de GuirinGaud, while on a visit Lagos decided to seek the help of his Nigerian counterpart, Colonel Henri Adefowope, asking him to come in to bolster the search for national reconciliation already started by the Chadian President Felix Malloum. (Akinterinwa, Bola 1982:259)

The role of France in Chad is summarised as follows; that she being the principal extra-african power operating in West and Central Africa, she is in a position of force to put her weight behind efforts at finding solutions to regional security problems (John Chipman, John 1986:93)

Following the French minister for foreign affair’s request for Nigeria’s active in Chad mentioned earlier on, can we see in this French request, a devolution of role to Nigeria as regards Chad or rather, can it be seen as a prolongation of positive bilateral relations into the realm of diplomatic and political relations?  It is noteworthy that it was this French appeal to Nigeria to intervene in efforts at finding solutions to the Chadian crisis that marked the beginning of the understanding or working co-operation between Nigeria and France over Chad.

Besides the Nigeria’s success in putting an end to French and Swiss hostage affair in Chad through her mediation efforts, other factors could best explain this diplomatic rapprochement’ between Nigeria and France.  According to a political observer of Chadian affairs, the intense economic and commercial relations noticeable in the early eighties between the two States were not without spill-over effects on their diplomacy in Chad   (Otayek, Rene 1983:93)

In fact, in 1978, Nigeria was the most important market for French goods in Africa South of the Sahara and its fourth most important place for French foreign investments in the world   (Delancey.M.W 1983:172) Another factor is attributable to the redefinition and re-deployment in the determination of French interests in Africa especially under President Giscard d’Estaing (Otayek Rene, 1979: 53) Finally, there was this Chado-Libyan unification project of January 1981.  As it has been observed, it was this unification project which aroused the curiosity and the condemnation of Nigerian leaders for reasons linked to regional balance of power (Nwokedi Emeka (1984:32)

The co-operation between Nigeria and France over Chadian crises took place under a climate of intrigues and unstable alliance formations on the part of the chief actors of the Chadian conflict.  Nigeria decided to hold the Chadian peace conference in March 1979 at Kano.  A coincidence was observed between this Nigerian decision to mediate and the announcement in the same month of March, by the French of the removal of their forces stationed in Chad (Otayek Rene Ibid).  According to a political observer, this coincidence was in fact a real one and that it was a product of a deep understanding (Ibid).

Put in proper perspectives, the Nigerian decision to hold the Kano conference was taken after the French government has made the proposition to it as a follow up to the French incapability to forcefully evacuate the Libyan forces from the Chadian territories (Nwokedi Emeka, 1979:201)

It is important to underline what were the side motivations for Nigeria’s initiatives on Chad in 1979 and in 1983.  It was observed that among other things, the Nigeria’s wish to reduce the French weight in the regional influence game was very important (Daniel BACH:1-6) At the same time, it could be added that this wish also marked the limit of the co-operation between Nigeria and France as well as any spill over effects that their economic relations might have over their politico-diplomatic relations.

The bad State of affairs in Nigeria’s relations with France over Chad seems to be a consequence of the in-congruency between the French government’s perception of the role she assigned or would have wished to assign to Nigeria over Chadian affairs; that is the role of a regional power challenging the Libyan influence in Chad (Nwokedi Emeka:17) “1986 and Nigeria’s refusal to play game.

The Nigerian government did not feel threatened by colonel Ghadaffi’s troops in Chad and it does not believe in the Western countries propagandist theory of Libyan expansion in West Africa; if Nigeria’s president Shehu Shagari criticised Libyan presence in Chad, it is because continued Libyan presence in Chad incites further foreign intervention                           (Suzanne Cronje, 1981:910-911)

On the 4th of May 1979, four Chadian factions or tendencies (French preferences) which where among the signatories of the Kano I accord decided to form a new union government with Loi Chaoua as the head.  Nigeria as well as Libya contested the legitimacy of this government on the grounds that it “violates the Kano accord” and it was considered as “a toy manipulated from Paris”. (Afriwue Contemporaine, 1979:27)  This is because it was only the French authorities that gave recognition and supported the Chaoua government (Emeka Nwokedi:7)

The Nigeria’s hard position vis-à-vis this Chaoua government was further encouraged by the unequivocal assertion by the Chadian government, of its total confidence in France their former colonial masters, than in any other country in helping them in the difficult task of national reconciliation, for the simple reason that the French knows and understand best their problems than other countries  ( Otayek, Rene 1979:57)

If it is true that the co-operation between Nigeria and France broke down due to different positions taken by the two countries as regards Chadian government of Chaoua; this does not signify the end of their co-operation in Chad.  Another occasion came into being in January 1981.

Going against one of the supposedly governing principles of Nigeria’s foreign policy, The principles which tend to discourage any foreign intervention in the African problems and especially, French intervention, Nigeria went ahead to join efforts with extra-african powers to combat the Chado-Libyan unification project (Pauline Baker,H. 1984:85)   To that end, in January 1981, the Nigerian minister of foreign affairs in the person of Professor Ishaya Audu, making use of his official visit to Paris, announced that Nigeria was ready to furnish Chad with all forms of necessary aid including military aid (under the auspices of the O.A.U) to resist the Libyan pressures over the unification project  ( Times (Lagos),1978)
Essentially, the strategy (which was French in origin) was to persuade Goukouni Oueddei to press for the departure of Libyan troops and in return for additional direct French military aid as well as the stationing of a Pan-african peace keeping Force in Chad.  Nigeria’s acceptance of this strategy which included a peace keeping force, sponsored by O.A.U. with Nigerian troops, the logistical support supplied by France and U.S.A was described as being historical (Pauline Baker,H 1984:85)

Nigeria later played a prominent role in the peace keeping force in Chad.  A force in which its efficiency and effectiveness to carry out its mission was affected by both the rivalries between different Chadian factions as well as by its own proper financial and logistical problems. (Nwokedi, Emeka 1981:29)



CONCLUSION

It is admitted that the co-operation between Nigeria and France in the domain of political and diplomatic relations especially the so called entente Franco – Nigerian over Chad had its origin in medium and short term factors; it is being argued that it is difficult to ignore the spill-over effects of good economic and commercial relations between Nigeria and France over their political and economic relations especially in their co-operation over finding solutions to the Chadian crisis.

In other words, the important economic and commercial relations recorded in Nigeria France relations since 1975 and the contracts won in 1981 to 1987 (M.O.C.I), 1982:34)
 by French companies working in Nigeria created a favourable climate for joint political and diplomatic initiatives especially the type we observed over Chad.  Nevertheless, there is a limit to such entente; as it became clear that the divergent interests of the two countries in the domain of their respective policies on Africa create a wide gulf between them.

Nigeria finds it a bit difficult to reconcile her hostility to French influence in Africa south of the sahara, or the foreign intervention in Africa in general, to the imperatives of her national security which is only assured with the absence of zones of conflict and the attendant foreign troops in the neighbouring countries.

Finally, the French’s principal interest lies in preserving its influence in Chad. . (M.O.C.I), 1982:34) Chad being her former colony and at the same time, she wants to be able to demonstrate her capability for intervention on the side of those French speaking African States, her allies and privileged partners.  Thus her major pre-occupation is to make sure that no solution is found to Chadian conflict that excludes her contribution.




NOTE AND REFERENCES


GAMBARI, Ibrahim (1987) “Nigeria – France Relation: Problems and Prospects” in OKELLO OCULI, (ed), Nigerian Alternatives, Department of Political Science, A.B.U Zaria. 1987 p.239-248.

 IBRAHIM, Jibrin (1986). “Franco-Nigerian economic relations” Paper presented at All Nigeria Conference on Foreign Policy. Kuru. 6th –13th April 21pps.

NWOKEDI, Emeka (1984) “Le Nigeria et le conflict Tchadien: Affirmation ou Infirmation d’une puissance sous regionale?” Le Mois en Afrique.19, No. 221-222,. P.27.

FAWOLE, W. A.  (1981 –1983) “Regional interference and the Internationalisation of the Chadian Civil War” Nigerian Journal of International Studies. Vol.5 – 7. pps.96-97.

BACH, Daniel (1984.)  “Le Nigeria et le Chad: Echec d’une politique de stabilisation du conflict” Politique Africaine 16 December pp.125-126

AKINTERINWA, Bola (1982) La Politique Exterieure du Nigeria et les relations avec la France de 1958 a 1982 Doctorate Thesis, University of Sorbonne. Paris.p.259 

CHIPMAN, John (1986) Ve Republique et la defense de l’Afrique. Editions Bousquet. Paris p.93

OTAYEK, Rene (1983) “L’instervention du Nigeria dans le Conflict Chadian: Heurs et Malheurs ‘d’un nouveau centre de pouvoir’” Le Mois en Afrique.No.209 – 210, June – July p.53.

DELANCEY, M. W.  (1983) “Nigerian Foreign Policy Alternatives” T. M. SHAW and O. ALUKO (eds), Nigerian Foreign Policy Alternative Perceptions and Propositions The Macmillan Press Ltd. London and Basingstroke. p.172.

NWOKEDI, Emeka (1984) “Le Nigeria et le conflict Tchadien: Affirmation ou Infirmation d’une puissance sous regionale?” Le Mois en Afrique. 19, No. 221-222, p.32.


NWOKEDI, Emeka (1979) “Sub-regional Security and Nigerian Foreign Policy” African      Affairs (London), Vol.84 No.335 April 1985, p.201 Daily Times (Lagos), June 7,


 NWOKEDI, Emeka (1986)” Nigeria and France” unpublished draft article. Ife. p.17.

CRONJE, Suzanne (1981) “La vigilance affirmee de Lagos dans les conflicts du Tchad et de l’Afrique Australe” in Le Monde Diplomatique (Paris), October 1981, p.18. J. O. ENUKORA, “Audu denies visiting Libya”, West Africa, 27 April 1981. pp.910 –911.

Afriwue Contemporaine (Paris), (1979)  No.105 September – October.p.27


OTAYEK, Rene, (1979), Bulletin Quotidien de l’Afrique (Paris), No.9903 28 June . op. cit. p.57.

BAKER, H. Pauline (1984) “A Giant Staggers: Nigeria as an emerging regional Power” in Arlinghaus. E. B. (ed), African Security Issues, Sovereignty, Stability, and Solidarity Westview Press. Boulder. Colorado. p.85.

Times (Lagos), 28 January (1981).

BAKER, H. Pauline op. cit. p.85

GAUTRON, Jean- Claude, “La Force de maintien de la paix au Tchad: eloge ou requiem?” Annee Africaine. Pedone. Paris.pp.167-189.

Marches Tropicaux et Mediterraneens. Paris. 28 August 1981. M. O. C. I research revealed that a total sum of 16.5 billions French francs was the amount of the contracts won by French companies working in Nigeria.  See, Moniteur du Commerce International. (M.O.C.I), Paris. No 516 – 517, 16 –23 August 1982. p.34











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