THEORIES OF WAR
THE STRATEGIC
APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS-
p.36
Since the term
‘Strategy’ is now generally used to describe the use of available resources to
gain any objective…..
‘The Strategic
Approach’ is thus one which takes account of the part which is played by force,
or the threat of force, in the international system.
The strategic
approach derives from two characteristics of the international system. The
first is the instability of the Actors themselves. The Second aspect of
international politics on which the Strategic approach lays emphasis is the
function of the State as the guardian of certain value-systems.
The Forgotten
Dimensions of Strategy- p.101
The term
‘Strategy’ needs continual definition. For most people, Clausewitz’s
formulation ‘the use of engagements for the object of war’ or as Liddell Hart
paraphrased it, ‘the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil
the ends of policy’ is clear enough.
Strategy concerns
the deployment and use of armed forces to attain a given political objective.
In essence, a strategy
is a chosen course of action for pursuing an objective.
The present-day tendency to
use the terms ‘strategy’, ‘tactics’
and ‘policy’ vaguely and
indiscriminately in various fields makes it difficult to reconcile their current meanings with what earlier,
often more careful writers on war and strategy meant.
The word ‘tactics’ is the English form of the
Greek word taktika which
in turn came from the noun taxis (arrangement) and the verb tasso (to set in order or to
arrange). In its original usage, it was applied to the arrangement in
formations of soldiers on the battlefield for close combat or hand to hand
fighting.
So by the
beginning of this century, war was conducted in these four dimensions: the
operational, the logistical, the social and the technological. No successful strategy
could be formulated that did not take account of them all.
Another Concept is
’Tactics’. In 1690 the French-man Furet wrote that tactics constituted the
‘science de ranger les soldats en bataille et de faire les evolutions
militaires’.
1819 Rees defined
tactics as ‘the art of disposing forces in form of battle and of performing the
military and naval motions and evolutions.
As an abstract
concept, tactics referred to the arrangements and deployments adopted by forces
in battle to gain the maximum advantage from their weapons.
In contrast to the
concept of ‘Tactics’, the concept of ‘Strategy’ is not necessarily associated
with fighting. It is concerned with the wider conduct of a conflict, a war or a
campaign, encompassing all its facets rather than the single facet of fighting.
As an abstract
concept the term Strategy will be used in this course to mean ‘the method of
using means of coercion to create an untenable situation for an opponent’.
Strategy is used
by a government, acting through its agencies such as the armed forces or
various civilian departments, in conflict with a foreign government. The use of
the means is directed at producing a situation that will influence the opponent
not to embark on or continue with intended behaviour for fear of the
consequences.
General Andre
Beaufre (1901- 1975) coined some terms that helps in narrowing the scope of the
concept of Strategy. Each term refers to different levels of the working
CHANGING
NATURE OF WARFARE
CAUSES
OF WAR
Introduction-
Although a few writers may claim a single cause of war exists, such as a human
instinct for aggression, most writers identify multiple causes for a given war
and realize that the causes may vary from one war to another.
Clausewitz's w:On War has become the bible of strategy, dealing
with political, as well as military, leadership. His most famous assertion
being:
"War is not merely a
political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of policy
carried out by other means."
I-
Cold War Strategy
The Cold War was the first time period dominated by the threat of total
world annihilation through the use of nuclear weapons, a policy known as w:mutual assured destruction. As a
consequence it was also a war in which attacks were not exchanged between the
two main rivals, the w:United States and the w:Soviet
Union. Instead, the war was fought through proxies. The battle-grounds were
everywhere the superpowers weren't. Instead of mainly being confined to Europe
or the Pacific, the entire world was the battlefield, with countries rather
than armies acting as main players. The only constant rule was that troops of
the Soviet Union and the United States could not overtly fight with each other.
The difference between tactics, strategy and grand strategy began to melt
during the Cold War as command and communication technologies improved to a
greater extent, in first world armed forces. The armed forces of developing
countries controlled by the two superpowers formed that grand strategy,
strategy and tactics, if anything, moved further apart as the command of the
armies fell under the control of super power leaders.
American cold warriors like w:Dean
Acheson and George C. Marshall quickly recognized that the
key to victory was the economic defeat of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union
had adopted a defensive posture following the end of World War II, with the United
States and its strong navy quickly finding that it had to aggressively defend
much of the world from the Soviet Union and the spread of Communism. It was one
of many seeming contradictions in the logic of strategy.
Strategies during the Cold War also dealt with
nuclear attack and retaliation. The United States maintained a policy of w:limited first strike throughout the Cold
War. In the event of a Soviet attack on the Western Front, resulting in a
breakthrough, the United States would use tactical nuclear weapons to stop the
attack. The Soviet Union responded by adopting a policy of w:no
first use, involving massive retaliation resulting in mutual assured
destruction. So, if the w:Warsaw Pact attacked using conventional weapons, w:NATO would use
tactical nukes. The Soviet Union would respond with an all out nuclear attack,
resulting in a similar attack from the United States, with all the consequences
the exchange would entail. This did not happen. The United States continues to
maintain a policy of limited first strike to the present (June 2004).
II-
[edit] Post
Cold War Strategy
Prominent theories about
the causes of war could be presented along the lines traced by Kenneth.N.Waltz
in his classic study, Man, the State and
War He employed the levels-of analysis scheme. This means that the possible
causes of war are organized along the Individual,
State and International Levels.
I-
Individual –level Causes of War
·
The
root cause of war lies in the nature of
people, making them aggressive or hostile.
·
Sigmund
Freud (1856-1939), the pioneer of psychoanalysis, thought people have both a
life instinct and a death instinct.
·
Another
individual-level cause of war involves personalities
·
Joe
Stroessinger in Why Nations Go to war,
considers the role of the personalities of leaders in assessing the cause of
wars.
·
The
most important question in individual-level analysis is whether aggression and
war are instinctive or learned.
II- State-Level
Causes of War
·
Prof.
Russett and Zee Maoz in their study, “Normative and Structural Causes of
Democratic Peace, 1946-1986” APSR Sept.
1993 find that the norms are stronger explanation than structure as to why
democracies are at peace with one another, although the two overlap and
reinforce each other.
·
V.I.Lenin’s
claim in his work, Imperialism (1918)
that capitalism, in its highest stage, results in a feverish drive for more raw
materials, cheap labour, and new markets. Since a number of capitalist States
have the same needs at the same time, the conflict becomes intense enough to
result in war as a way to eliminate trade rivals.
·
We
cannot easily dismiss economic motives for war. Economic needs drove Japan to seek
reliable supplies of oil and raw materials by seizing China , Manchuria and the European and American holdings in the
Pacific.
III-
System-Level Causes of War
·
The
classic explanation for war rests on the sovereign right of States to go to war
because they suffer the anarchy of the international system.
·
The hegemonic theory of war according to Robert Gilpin states that, war
occurs only when the growth of power by a subordinate State in the power
hierarchy challenges the recognized hegemon.
Writers wishing to generalize about
war’s causes have had to deal with phenomena as diverse as the role of
nationalism, ethnic conflict, and inequitable distribution of economic
resources.
Causes of war
There is great debate over why wars happen, even when most people do not
want them to. Representatives of many different academic disciplines have
attempted to explain war.
III- [edit] Historians
Historians tend to be reluctant to look for sweeping explanations for all
wars. A. J. P. Taylor famously described wars as being like traffic accidents.
There are some conditions and situations that make them more likely but there
can be no system for predicting where and when each one will occur. Social
scientists criticize this approach arguing that at the beginning of every war
some leader makes a conscious decision and that they cannot be seen as purely
accidental.
IV- [edit] Psychological
theories
Psychologists
such as E.F.M. Durban and John
Bowlby have argued that human beings, especially men, are inherently
violent. While this violence is repressed in normal society it needs the
occasional outlet provided by war. This combines with other notions, such as displacement
where a person transfers their grievances into bias and hatred against other
ethnic groups, nations, or ideologies. While these theories can explain why
wars occur, they do not explain when or how they occur. In addition, they raise
the question why there are sometimes long periods of peace and other eras of
unending war. If the innate psychology of the human mind is unchanging, these
variations are inconsistent.
A solution adopted to this problem by militarists such as Franz
Alexander is that peace does not really exist. Periods that are seen as
peaceful are actually periods of preparation for a later war or when war is
suppressed by a state of great power, such as the Pax
Britannica.
If war is innate to human nature, as is presupposed by many psychological
theories, then there is little hope of ever escaping it. One alternative is to
argue that war is only, or almost only, a male activity and if human leadership
was in female hands wars would not occur. This theory has played an important
role in modern feminism. Critics, of course, point to various examples
of female political leaders who had no qualms about using military force, such
as Margaret Thatcher.
Other psychologists have argued that while human temperament allows wars to
occur, they only do so when mentally unbalanced men are in control of a nation.
This school argues leaders that seek war such as Napoleon, Hitler, and Stalin were
mentally abnormal and thus if some sort of screening process, such as
elections, could prevent these types from coming to power, war would end.
A distinct branch of the psychological theories of war are the arguments
based on evolutionary psychology. This school
tends to see war as an extension of animal behaviour, such as territoriality
and competition. However, while war has a natural cause the development of
technology has accelerated human destructiveness to a level that is irrational
and damaging to the species. We have the same instincts of a chimpanzee but
overwhelmingly more power. The earliest advocate of this theory was Konrad
Lorenz. These theories have been criticized by scholars such as John
G. Kennedy, who argue that the organized, sustained war of humans differs
more than just technologically from the territorial fights between animals.
V- [edit] Anthropological
theories
Anthropologists
take a very different view of war. They see it as fundamentally cultural,
learnt by nurture rather than nature. Thus if human societies could be reformed
war would disappear. To this school the acceptance of war is inculcated into
each of us by the religious, ideological,
and nationalistic
surroundings in which we live.
Anthropologists also see no links between various forms of violence. They
see the fighting of animals, the skirmishes of hunter-gatherer
tribes, and the organized warfare of modern societies as distinct phenomena
each with their own causes. Theorists such as Ashley
Montagu emphasize the top down nature of war, that almost all wars are
begun not by popular pressure but by the whims of leaders and that these
leaders also work to maintain the system of ideological justifications for war.
VI- [edit] Sociological
theories
Sociology has long been very concerned with the origins of war, and many
thousands of theories have been advanced, many of them contradictory. Some use
detailed formulas taking into account hundreds of demographic and economic
values to predict when and where wars will break out. The statistical analysis
of war was pioneered by Lewis Fry Richardson following World War I. More recent
databases of wars and armed conflict have been assembled by the Correlates of
War Project, Peter Brecke and the Uppsala Department of Peace and Conflict
Research. So far none of these formulas have successfully predicted the
outbreak of future conflicts. On the other hand there is a case for avoiding
war in the Democratic peace theory, since liberal democracies rarely go to war
against each other. A detailed study by Michael Haas found that no single
variable has a strong correlation to the occurrence of wars. There have been
many other attempts at Predicting War.
Many sociologists have attempted to divide wars into types to get better
correlations, but this has also produced mixed results. Data looked at by R.J.
Rummel has found that civil wars and foreign wars are very different in origin,
but Jonathan Wilkenfield using different data found just the opposite.
Sociology has thus divided into a number of schools. One based on the works
of Eckart Kehr and Hans-Ulrich Wehler sees war as the product of domestic
conditions, with only the target of aggression being determined by
international realities. Thus World War I was not a product of international
disputes, secret treaties, or the balance of power but a product of the
economic, social, and political situation within each of the states involved.
This differs from the traditional approach of Karl von Clausewitz and
Leopold von Ranke that argue it is the decisions of statesmen and the
geopolitical situation that leads to war.
VII-
[edit] Information
theories
A popular new approach is to look at the role of information in the
outbreak of wars. This theory, advanced by scholars of international relations
such as Geoffrey Blainey, argues that all wars are based on a lack of
information. If both sides at the outset knew the result neither would fight,
the loser would merely surrender and avoid the cost in lives and infrastructure
that a war would cause.
This is based on the notion that wars are reciprocal, that all wars require
both a decision to attack and also a decision to resist attack. This notion is
generally agreed to by almost all scholars of war since Karl von Clausewitz.
This notion is made harder to accept because it is far more common to study the
cause of wars rather than events that failed to cause wars, and wars are far
more memorable. However, throughout history there are as many invasions and
annexations that did not lead to a war, such as the U.S.-led invasion of Haiti
in 1994, the Nazi invasions of Austria and Czechoslovakia preceding the Second
World War, and the annexation of the Baltic states by the Soviet Union in 1940.
On the other hand, Finland's decision to resist a similar Soviet aggression in
1939 led to the Winter War.
The leaders of these nations chose not to resist as they saw the potential
benefits being not worth the loss of life and destruction such resistance would
cause. Lack of information may not only be to who wins in the immediate future.
The Norwegian decision to resist the Nazi invasion was taken with the certain
knowledge that Norway would fall. The Norwegians did not know whether the
German domination would be permanent and also felt that noble resistance would
win them favour with the Allies and a position at the peace settlement in the
event of an Allied victory. If in 1941 it had been known with certainty the
Germans would dominate central Europe for many decades, it is unlikely the Norwegians
would have resisted. If it had been known for certainty that the Third Reich
would collapse after only a few years of war, the Nazis would not have launched
the invasion at all.
This theory is predicated on the notion that the outcome of wars is not
randomly determined, but fully determined on factors such as doctrine,
economies, and power. While purely random events, such as storms or the right
person dying at the right time, might have had some effect on history, these
only influence a single battle or slightly alter the outcome of a war, but
would not mean the difference between victory and defeat.
There are two main objectives in the gathering of intelligence. The first
is to find out the ability of an enemy, the second their intent. In theory to
have enough information to prevent all wars both need to be fully known. The
Argentinean dictatorship knew that Britain had the ability to defeat them but
their intelligence failed them on the question of whether the British would use
their power to resist the annexation of the Falklands. The American decision to
enter the Vietnam War was made with the full knowledge that the communist
forces would resist them, but did not believe that the guerillas had the
capability to long oppose American forces.
One major difficulty is that in a conflict of interests, some deception or
at least not telling everything is a standard tactical component on both sides.
If you think that you can convince the opponent that you will fight, the
opponent might desist. For example, Sweden made efforts to deceive Nazi Germany
that it would resist an attack fiercly partly by playing on the myth of Arian
superiority, and by making sure that Hermann Göring only saw Elite troops in
action, often dressed up as regular soldiers, when he came to visit.
VIII- [edit] Economic
theories
Another school of thought argues that war can be seen as an outgrowth of
economic competition in a chaotic and competitive international system. That
wars begin as a pursuit of new markets, of natural resources, and of wealth.
Unquestionably a cause of some wars, from the empire building of Britain to the
Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in pursuit of oil this theory has been
applied to many other conflicts. It is most often advocated by those of the
left of the political spectrum who argue that such wars serve only the
interests of the wealthy but are fought by the poor.
IX- [edit] Marxist
theories
The economic theories also form a part of the Marxist theory of war, which
argues that all war grows out of the class war. It sees wars as imperial
ventures to enhance the power of the ruling class and divide the proletariat of
the world by pitting them against each other for contrived ideals such as
nationalism or religion. Further, wars are a natural outgrowth of the free
market and class system, and will not disappear until the world revolution
occurs.
TYPES OF WAR
International
Relations specialists interested in patterns of war always want to know about
the type of war in a particular case or the type of war that characterizes a
period of history.
I-
Conventional
war- It is usually
conducted by the uniformed military
personnel of States that use modern weapons such as tanks, ships, artillery,
warplanes, and other modern technology short of dread weapons of mass
destruction, which include nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.
Conventional technology today can include the high-tech weapons that appeared
in the Persian Gulf War in 1991, principally the “smart bombs” guided to their
targets by a laser beam and Tomahawk cruise missiles directed to their
objectives by a television camera in the missiles’ noses. Other examples of
Conventional wars are the Falkland Islands War of 1982 and the Iran-Iraq war
(1980-1988).
II-
Guerrilla
Wars- These are much more
common than conventional wars. The tactics of guerrilla war are ancient, but
today’s military experts regard them as honed art as practiced and written by
Mao Zedong (1893-1976). His war against the Nationalist government of China in the
1930s and 1940s was a textbook case of how to fight guerrilla war. In a
guerrilla war, it is will power that often proves decisive.
III-
Counter
guerrilla war- or
counter-insurgency tactics have developed to offset the tactics of guerrilla
war, but with mixed success.
IV-
Low-intensity
warfare describes a war
that festers with sporadic fighting and few casualties but seemingly will not
end. The lingering war between the British and the Irish Republican Army (IRA)
in Northern Ireland
is a low –intensity war as well as an urban guerrilla enemy.
V-
CIVIL
WAR- This is another common
type of war fought in the last several decades. A Civil War is fought between
two political groups within the same country. Either the two groups are
fighting over which group will be the only government of the entire State or
one faction wants to break away and establish a new, separate government on
part of the country’s territory.
VI-
REBELLION
& REVOLUTION
These have also occurred frequently in the
Developing World, although other areas have seen these conflicts as well. A REBELLION
is a popular uprising usually in one part of a country, by one element of the
population, and the violence involved is usually spontaneous in nature. A
Rebellion, however, may easily escalate into a Revolution with a highly
organized effort to overthrow the government and to transform society according
to an ideological blueprint. When organized fighters motivated by ideology,
such as the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, fight for years for the chance to capture
the government and then use it to restructure society, a REVOLUTION has
occurred.
THE JUST WAR CONCEPT
The brief Persian
Gulf War in 1991 was important because a coalition of States, acting under the
auspices of the United Nations, stopped Iraqi aggression in Kuwait .
Moreover, this war was important because the advocates of force couched the
action in just war terms. In his work, Just and Unjust Wars,
Michael Walzer says that a just war has a moral dualism: Its supporters
must fight not only for moral reasons but with moral means.
PRINCIPLES OF A JUST WAR
·
The
cause must be just- the defence of Kuwait from aggression based on a
Western perception of threat.
·
A
lawful authority must decide to use force – the United States Congress and
United Nations Security Council authorized the use of force, but only after
some U.S forces were already on the scene.
·
The
use of force must be a final resort- the UN coalition applied economic
sanctions first, but perhaps did not give them enough time to have a desired
effect.
·
The
war must offer proportionally, meaning the good achieved must outweigh the
damage done- the Un coalition freed Kuwait from Iraqi clutches, but with great
ecological damage to the area and by killing thousands of Iraqi soldiers, not
to mention “friendly fire” killing some American and British troops..
·
The
war must carry at least a probability of success- the superior United Nations
forces won a quick victory and with lighter casualties than expected.
·
The
methods of war must minimize damage to non combatants- the accurate bombing
restricted collateral damage, but probably many civilians died in Iraq as a
result of the war.
Carl Von
Clausewitz asserts that war is but the continuation of politics by other means.
He went on to connect war to politics by developing the following ‘Trinity of
War’:
·
Political
leaders decide on the goals and then control the general course of the war.
·
The
military skilfully fights the war, choosing the specifics of strategy and
tactics.
·
The
populace gives material resources and passion to the war efforts.
NOTES ON LETHAL WEAPONS OF WAR
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
These are the
first generation Atomic Bomb detonated towards the end of WWII in Hiroshima and Nagasaki killing
thousands of Japanese instantly.
Characteristics of
Nuclear Weapons
·
The
energy released from the nuclear of a Uranium atom by chemical fusion or fusion
in fraction of a second producing mushroom cloud from ground zero to a distance
of 20km .
·
This
flatters, blasts, results in flying glass, fire and heat killing people by
asphyxiating victims and eventually damaging environment in what Professor Carl
Sagan called Nuclear Winter, thesis known as Ecocide.
·
There
are second and third generation nuclear weapons such as Hydrogen and Neutron
Bombs with near apocalyptic effects.
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
·
These
include delivery vehicle, payloads and warheads,
·
Virus
and bacteria in biotechnology brought new generation of weapons producing
poisonous culture, capable of killing human victims.
·
It is
defined as a living organism or infectious nucleric acid derived from virus or
bacteria for hostile purposes, causing diseases or death in humans e.g Coxtella
Barnetti, Bacculus Anthrax, Etc
CHEMICAL WEAPONS
·
Germans
introduced these in WWI in form of tear
gas grenades.
·
Italians
also used chemical weapons in Ethiopia
in 1935.
·
Saddam
Hussein used it on the Kurds and Iranians during the 1980-1988 Iran- Iraq wars.
·
They
are also in delivery, pay load and lethal agents like chlorine, sulphurous
vapours, hydrogen cyanide.
STRATEGIC CONCEPTS OF THE COLD WAR ERA STRATEGIC STUDIES.
A-
SALT 1- Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
1
·
Strategic
Arms Limitation Treaty was signed in 1972 between the Americans and the
Russians in Vienna ,
sequel to 3-year negotiations.(1969-1972).
·
Limitations
were put on nuclear delivery weapons like MIRV (Multiple Independent Re-entry
Vehicles), limits on ABM (Anti Ballistic Missile) sites. The MIRV negotiations
were inconclusive while ABM limited both Americans and Russians to two sites
each.
·
In
1974 Vladivostok
agreement further limited ABM sites to one each.
·
There
were also ceiling on offensive weapons.
·
It was
not ratified by the US Senate during the Presidency of Jimmy Carter and Leonard
Brezhnev of USSR
now Russia .
B- ARMS CONTROL
Arms Control is usually
·
Mid-way
house between comprehensive disarmament on one hand, and armament on the other
hand.
·
They are usually embarked on when either full
or partial disarmament became impossible goals. They usually restrain the use
or restructuring of certain aspects of Arms race e.g prohibiting, testing, or
demilitarising geographical area e.g SALT1, SALTII.
·
They
include measures limiting, transferring or reducing risks of war.
·
It may
include certain category of weapons to be qualitative build up or quantitative
build down e.g They could be multilateral, bilateral, regional, or
international.
C- DISARMAMENT
·
It
could be from a moral or natural point of view.
·
It
could also be unilateral, general or partial.
·
Pacifists
believe that disarmament strategies could put the arms race cycle into reverse,
e.g 1958 (UNDC) United Nations Disarmament Conference, the Soviets staged a
walkout.
·
From
1965 to 1978, the cold war contributed to its inactivity.
D- BARUCH PLAN- was an American –sponsored disarmament plan
submitted to UNAEC (United Nations Atomic Energy Commission) in 1946, which was
based on Archeason Recommendation. It proposed the establishing of IADA
(International Atomic Development Authority). It also includes the peaceful use
of the nuclear energy, granting inspection power to the authority of IADA. The
Plan also included the termination of Production, application of Stiff
penalties for Treaty violations e.t.c.
E- SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS
These as defined
by the UN(United Nations)
are revolvers and
self loading rifles, pistols, and carbines, sub-machine guns and as Small Arms
on one hand. On the other hand, Light Weapons are complimentary to arms, which
included cartridges and shells, ammunitions and explosives.
TERRORISM
Terrorism
could be defined variously as
· “a form of
violence to achieve political goals where creating fear is usually high among
the intended effect”[1].
· “A symbolic
act designed to influence political behaviour by extra moral means entailing
the use or threat of violence”[3].
· “Threat or use of violence for political
purposes, when such action is intended to influence the attitude and behaviour
of a target group other than its immediate victims and its ramifications
transcend national boundaries”[4].
As
if to shed a bit of light on the belief that there is no universally accepted
definition of terrorism, certain three legal claims were postulated, arising
from the stalemate in United Nations on the subject.
·
Firstly, that
terrorism is defined and constituted by the “criminal acts” taken against
governments by individuals or groups”[6]
this is a position supported by most of the advanced industrial Western States
and some Latin Governments.
·
Secondly, that “
terrorism should be defined by acts in a
broader context so as to include acts of governmental groups that violate human
rights and reinforces policies such as apartheid.“[7]This
being a position supported by African States.
·
Thirdly, that the
definition of terrorism resides in “the motivation of the actor and the context
of the act”[8].This
position claims that to consider terrorism narrowly outside of national
liberation movements, is to "label inappropriately a freedom fighter as a
terrorist”, this particular stance is linked to that of a variety of developing
nations and Arab States.
Of
all these multitude of definitions of terrorism, an aspect that informs this
study is that of State Terrorism and the engendered frustration
induced terrorism otherwise described as the insurgent terrorism. In other
for the difference between the two forces to be made clear, an understanding of
the features of terrorist violence would be beneficial.
· The first observable feature is that “it is
politically motivated”[9]
· and secondly, that
“it is directed at persons who
threatened not on their own accounts, but with a view to influencing further
persons, in particular those with power, official or otherwise to affect the
political arrangements of the community in question”[10]
· Thirdly, that “terrorism can be practiced by armed
soldiers of an established government, police officers or other aspects of
purportedly legitimate governments”[11].
The
difference between State terrorism and insurgent terrorism has been laid
at the steps of the goals or ends of such actions;
“that States use terrorism in order to
prevent changes in the currently prevailing political arrangements, whereas the
insurgents use it in order to effect changes in them”[12]
From
the above, it is not in doubt that the strategy is the same. To round up the
discussion on the concept of terrorism, it might be of interest to share the
perception that sees terrorism as a graduated step of other forms of violent
actions referred to as Oppression and Repression.[13].
Oppression
has been defined as the situation where “Social and economic privileges are
denied to whole classes of people regardless of whether they oppose the
authorities”[14].
Repression
is the “use of coercion or the threat of
coercion against the opponents or potential opponents in other to prevent or
weaken their capability to oppose the authorities and their policies”[15].
While
terrorism is the “purposeful act or
threat of violence to create fear and/or compliant behaviour in a victim and/or
audience of the act or threat”[16].
A
further addition to the definition of the concept of terrorism; appears to have
linked the graduated steps; “the use of
terror, violence and intimidation to achieve an end. Fear and subjugation
produced by this. A system that uses terror to rule.”[17]
In essence,
oppression defines the political arena within which repression and terrorism
transpire.
Comprehensive
framework by which those who utilize a campaign of strategic terrorism seek to
attain their ends.
It identifies a
distinctive modus operandi:
1) Disorientation:
to alienate the authorities from their citizens, reducing the government to
impotence in the eyes of the population;
2) Target
response: to induce a target to respond in a manner that is favourable to the
insurgent cause;
3) Gaining
legitimacy: to exploit the emotional impact of the violence to insert an
alternative political message.
CAUSES OF TERRORISM
The causes of
terrorism appear to be varied. There does not appear to be one lone factor that
leads people to engage in acts of terror. Scholars have categorized motivations
for terrorism to include psychological, ideological, and strategic.
Psychological Perspective
Those that engage
in terrorism may do so for purely personal reasons, based on their own state of
mind. Their motivation may be nothing more than hate or the desire for power.
Ideological Perspective
Ideology is
defined as the beliefs, values, and/or principles by which a group identifies
its particular aims and goals. Ideology may encompass religion or political
philosophies and programmes.
Strategic Perspective
o Terrorism is sometimes seen as a logical
extension of the failure of politics. When people seek redress of their
grievances through government, but fail to win government’s attention to their
plight, they may resort to violence.
o From this viewpoint, terrorism is the
result of a logical analysis of the goals and objectives of a group, and their
estimate of the likelihood of gaining victory.
o If victory seems unlikely using more
traditional means of opposition, then one might calculate that terrorism is a
better option.
o For example, in South Africa , the African National
Congress only turned to the use of terrorism after political avenues were
explored and failed.
The Niger-Delta situation in Nigeria is
another example. Stakeholders’ meetings were held at different times to proffer
political solution to the long marginalization of the people of the region.
When action is needed on the resolutions arrived at, State machineries remain
grounded.
TYPOLOGIES OF TERRORISM
Terrorism can be
classified along 5 major lines namely;
·
By
place e.g. Domestic or International, Non-State or State sponsored,
Internecine.
·
By
Personality Trait e.g. Crazies or Crusaders, Criminals.
·
By
Purpose e.g. Political or Non-Political
·
By
Target e.g. Mass terror, Dynastic terror
·
By
Issue e.g. Revolutionary, Political, Nationalist, Cause-Based, Environmental,
State-sponsored, Nuclear, Genocide
5 Tactics that
Terrorists Use
·
Rolling, in which the terrorists drive a vehicle by in what
amounts to a hit and run manoeuvre.
·
Ambush, which is a standard platoon-level military manoeuvre
drawing the enemy into a line of fire.
·
Standoff, which is a back-against-the wall manoeuvre, usually
with an escape plan.
·
Boutique, which usually involve a combination of modes of attack,
but are intended primarily to have a large impact.
·
Revenge, which also usually has a large impact, at least
symbolically.
The 4 Modes of Attack, or Weapon Systems of Terrorists
·
Traditional- when makeshift or ordinary weapons are used.
·
Technological- when weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear,
chemical, or biological are used.
·
Cyber- when viruses, computer attacks, or destruction of
information infrastructure occur.
·
Narco- when flooding a market with drugs is used.
Certain Factors are known as Force Multipliers
·
Technology-
·
Trans-national support.
·
Media
·
Religion.
Terrorist Rely on Crimes and not Force
·
Bombing
·
Hijacking
·
Arson
·
Assault
·
Kidnapping
·
Hostage taking.
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AS STRATEGIC ISSUE IN THE WORLD
SYSTEM: AFRICA VS EURO-AMERICA
Development Assistance (also known as international
aid, overseas aid or foreign aid)
is
· aid given by developed countries to support the economic,
sociological and political development of developing countries.
· It is distinguished from humanitarian
aid as being aimed at alleviating poverty in the long term, rather than
alleviating suffering in the short term (Foreign aid, on the other hand,
includes both development aid and humanitarian aid.
· Some governments include military assistance
in the notion "foreign aid", while a lot of NGOs tend to disapprove).
Historically the term used for the donation of
expertise has been technical assistance.
· Official Development
Assistance The nations of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), made up of the developed
nations of the world, have committed to providing a certain level of development
assistance to underdeveloped countries.
· This is called Official Development Assistance
(ODA), and is given by governments on certain concessional terms, usually as
simple donations. It is given by governments through individual countries' international aid agencies (bilateral
aid), through multilateral institutions such as the World Bank,
or through development charities such as Oxfam.
Background
· The offer to give development
aid has to be understood in the context of the cold war.
· The speech in which Harry
Truman announced the foundation of NATO is also a founding
document of development policy. "In
addition, we will provide military advice and equipment to free nations which
will cooperate with us in the maintenance of peace and security. Fourth, we
must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific
advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of
underdeveloped areas. More than half the people of the world are living in
conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of
disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a
handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas. For the first
time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and skill to relieve the
suffering of these people.“
· Development Assistance
was aimed at offering technical solutions to social problems without altering
basic social structures. The United States was often
fiercely opposed to even moderate changes in social structures, for example the
land
reform in Guatemala
in the early 1950s.
2004 ODA figures
The combined Official Development Assistance of OECD countries in 2004
was $78.6 billion USD.
The United
States is the world's largest contributor of ODA in absolute terms, $19
billion, but this figure should be compared to the combined European
Union contribution that totaled $42.9 billion. Expressed as a percentage of
GNI, Norway's contributions
remained in the lead at 0.87%, with the combined EU at 0.36%. The United States
remains the lowest contributor in the OECD as a percentage of GNI, at 0.16%. [1]
Quantity
1. V.HELD “Terrorism, Rights and Political Goals” in
R.G.FREY and C.W.MORRIS(eds) Violence, Terrorism and Justice .Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge .
(New York, 1991),p.64
2. L. E. LOMASKY, “ The Political Significance of
Terrorism” in R.G. FREY and C. W. MORRIS (eds), op.cit, p.86
3. A. C. E. QUAINTON, “Terrorism: Policy, Action and
Reaction” in L. Z. FREEDMAN and Y. ALEXANDER (eds), Perspectives on
Terrorism Hindustan Publishing
Corporation (Delhi
,1985) 2nd Edition, p,169
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. M. STOHL and G.A. Lopez (eds), The State As
Terrorist: The Dynamics of Governmental Violence and Repression Aldwych Press, London , 1984, p.4
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. J. NARVESON, “Terrorism and Morality” in R.G. FREY
and C. W. MORRIS (eds), Violence, Terrorism and Justice (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
1991,p.117
10. Ibid. p.117
11. Ibid, p.117
12. Ibid, p.117
13. M. STOHL and G. A LOPEZ (eds). The State As
Terrorist op.cit. p.7
14. Ibid. p. 7
15. Ibid. p. 7
16. Ibid. p. 7
17. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language Roston: Houghton Mijflin, 1969, p. 1330.